The Need for a Stronger Director of National Intelligence

The September 11, 2001 terror attacks (9/11) led to serious questions on the size and competence of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), and nearly two decades on the same questions remain. This is despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars, expanded authority, and increased abilities. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  (IRTPA), was the most comprehensive overhaul of US intelligence in history and created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)  and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in an attempt to provide leadership and direction for the IC, foster cooperation amongst agencies, and reduce bureaucracy. The DNI has mostly failed in this role and continues to struggle to wrangle the IC’s 16 agencies in a consistent direction and provide them with the necessary oversight and leadership. This is largely due to the weakness of IRTPA which prevents it from exercising the full authority over the IC especially concerning agency budgets, strategy, appointments, and information sharing.

Perhaps the most notable public example of the weakness of the DNI was the public battle between DNI Dennis Blair and DCIA Leon Panetta in 2010 over the appointment of senior intelligence officials abroad. The DNI would lose the battle and tender his resignation shortly afterward. The DNI's loss was largely thought to have been due to the DCIA's better relationship with President Obama, which highlights the DNI’s lack of authority over the agencies which it oversees. In its short history, the ODNI has taken to relying on strong leaders and their relationships with the President or members of Congress to achieve IC reform and integration, which is a poor substitute for statutory authority. 

A 2018 reorganization of the ODNI by DNI Dan Coates sought to better integrate intelligence streams, push decision making authority lower in the chain of command, promote partnerships, and strategize for future threats. The reform also created four new deputy positions, along with additional staffing, while not eliminating any positions from elsewhere in the IC.  Reform without an increase in the DNI’s authority to enact, rather than suggest, change resulted in the creation of more bureaucracy within the IC instead of eliminating it. Complaints from within the IC over ODNI redundancy, a lack of integrated databases, tensions between agencies, and a muddled chain of command for decision making abound and closely resemble the list of problems that the DNI was supposed to address. While there hasn’t been another 9/11 on the DNI’s watch, there have been failures by the IC to accurately predict and counter events such as the Arab Spring and Vladimir Putin’s forays into US elections or Ukraine. This shows that the IC continues to struggle with meeting new and emerging threats, just as it did before 9/11 with terrorism, as it focuses on current threats and gives less effort towards strategic planning for future threats.  The DNI needs more authority to enact change and streamline the IC if we are to avoid the next 9/11 style intelligence failure.