Decapitation Strategy: Why the Islamic State Has Been More Resilient Than Al-Qaeda

On October 27th, 2019 eight years after President Obama announced the death of Osama Bin Laden the leader of Al Qaeda, President Trump announced the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the leader of ISIS. Both Presidents successively eliminated high valued targets in the terrorism world using what is referred to as decapitation strategy. Decapitation strategy is killing a leader of an organization in an effort to dismantle it. However, al-Baghdadi’s death is not having the same impact on the Islamic State (ISIS) as Osama Bin Laden’s death did on Al-Qaeda. That is because the Islamic State paid attention to the failures of Al-Qaeda when creating its own hierarchical structure and strategy. Al-Qaeda got its start in the 1980s as a result of the anti-jihad movement in Afghanistan. They became household names after the attacks they carried out on two U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998, followed just shortly by the attacks on the Twin Towers on 9/11. In comparison, the Islamic State got its start in 2003 as an Iraq organization in response to the U.S. invasion. Despite their similar motivating circumstances in the creation of each organization, the similarities stop there.

The Islamic State has created its organizational structure and goals in a way that has made it more resilient in the face of decapitation strikes than Al-Qaeda. First, in regards to leadership and the upper echelons of the organizations the Islamic State is not as centralized and radically less publicized. The Islamic State created numerous security measures to obscure Baghdadi’s identity. For example, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi led the Islamic State for nearly a decade but only appeared in video twice. Whereas Bin Laden issued numerous “proof of life” videos in response to reports of his death. The Islamic State’s strategy in obscuring its leader’s identity has two benefits, it makes him harder to track, but it also prevents him from becoming a public symbol of the organization. Osama Bin Laden became such an iconic symbol for Al-Qaeda it made his death more impactful on Al-Qaeda and its image. Instead of publicizing its leaders the Islamic State publicize its members and followers which also serves a recruitment and radicalization tool. Beyond taking the emphasis off of its leader, the Islamic State has also created an organizational structure that is much more resilient to decapitation strikes. It is organized in a way that there are several potential successors ready to go in case of high-value member's death. Baghdadi’s successor was named four days after his death compared to the six weeks it took to announce Bin Laden’s successor. The Islamic State’s structure creates a perception that it is not dependent on just one person for its survival. That having a leader is important, but one person doesn’t make or break them and there are always people ready to step up when called upon.

The Islamic State has also been strategically expanding its territorial control to establish wide-reaching areas of influence to help its resilience. Territorial expansion creates more of a base for the Islamic State, giving them more people to draw into their organization, creating a more stable foundation for the organization. Lastly, the impact of decapitation strategy was more damaging for Al-Qaeda than the Islamic State in part due to timing. Al-Qaeda was already weakened by the Arab Spring and its cries for democracy. The United States then eliminated Bin Laden, the symbol of the organization, further weakening them internally and their external image which they haven’t been able to recover from. It is important to note that in neither case was decapitation strategy successful in destroying either organization and many doubt the strategy ever would be.