Strategy results from the combination of four elements (according to Lykke): ends, ways, means, and risk. In other words, it translates courses of action (often by military means) into political objectives, through the allocation of resources and minimization of risk. The strategic end goals of this equation are the political objectives, or policies, dictated by Congress and the White House to agency heads, both civilian and military. Policy governs strategy, but it is up to these agency heads to work through the ways, means, and risk involved. The system then relies on healthy civil-military relations to optimize U.S. options under each policy.
Unfortunately, the increasing complexities and growing divide one finds in U.S. civil-military relations pose a challenge to the U.S. capacity for grand strategy. This governmental divide between civilian policymakers and military officials stems from organizational and cultural differences in their respective agencies and command structures. For one, policymakers cannot always anticipate every situation with long-term policy needs. But in the absence of policy, the situation may be urgent enough to require direction anyway; that is when other officials and analysts must step in (and even make educated guesses) to keep the strategy machine going.
This civil-military divide forms a dichotomy that the U.S. continues to find difficulties traversing. But solid strategic thinking is less of a dichotomy than balancing in the middle of a wide-ranging spectrum. Characteristics and attributes of strategists along this spectrum include: being historically-minded but future-oriented; thinking analytically and creatively; having both practical expertise and knowledge of theory; and being simultaneously apolitical and politically savvy. Good strategists--whether civilian or military, policymaker or analyst--must find a balance between these attributes in order to find a place in and best contribute to U.S. grand strategy aspirations.
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