North Korean Coercion

In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling wrote about the distinction between 'brute force' (i.e. direct military action) and coercion (the use of threats to deter or compel). Both categories bring to bear their own inherent bargaining power, but methods of coercion have become especially prevalent in recent decades. 

North Korean coercion relies heavily on military activity (although not direct action as of yet), to deter enemy aggression and compel compliance with its demands. Kim Jong Un and government officials regularly announce rocket and ballistic missile tests and progress updates on the state's nuclear program; these actions are meant to instill fear in North Korea's adversaries, while impressing its few allies. Other coercive measures include state visits, limited diplomatic talks, military exercises (both solitary and jointly), and even cyber attacks. China and Russia sometimes add further weight to these coercive measures in their willingness to partner with North Korea, in addition to the economic aid, diplomatic support, and military/law enforcement cooperation they provide.

Before North Korea ever admitted any cases of COVID-19, Russia pledged to send 1500 test kits, and China is easily North Korea's biggest trade partner in terms of imports and exports. The UN had already granted limited sanction relief, but closed borders and an internal lockdown have stopped North Korea from receiving much of the aid its people need; this puts North Korea in a very defensive position. Between the COVID-19 pandemic and North Korea's already aggressive, isolationist habits, the U.S. and other states seeking denuclearization and regional stability through diplomatic means may have trouble negotiating with the beleaguered communist state. North Korea's government will prioritize strength and self-reliance, and continue to push for threatening (and destabilizing) tests, exercises, and progress reports that are part of its coercive toolkit.