Japan's Security Dilemma

Photo: A Chinese coast guard vessel near disputed islands in the East China Sea (August 2016). 

As Abe's successor Yoshihide Suga finds his footing during his first weeks in office, Japan faces growing tensions with China in the East China Sea. Both Japan and China have historical claims to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and maintain vessels nearby. China has increased its coast guard presence in the islands' vicinity, which Japan views as an escalation regardless of China's stated reasoning. Additional 'aggressive behavior' in the East China Sea has contributed to public calls to cancel Xi Jinping's upcoming state visit. In addition to these regionally-focused tensions, Japan faces concerns over Chinese and North Korean efforts to expand missile stockpiles. Since North Korea successfully fired two nuclear-capable ballistic missiles over Japan in 2017, Kim Jong Un has made progress on many smaller solid-fuel missiles designed with US-made interceptors in mind. As Xi Jinping demonstrated in a military parade in 2019, China is also developing weapon systems to counteract certain capabilities such as its DF-17 missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle.  

Some in Japan (including its former prime minister Abe) argue that Japan must build up its offensive capability in order to prepare for and combat these threats, while others emphasize the importance of missile defense. In 2017, the Japanese Defense Ministry allocated funds for an air-to-surface Joint Strike Missile, and the 2020 budget included allocations for F-35-mounted cruise missiles. However, as the US pressures Japan to play a bigger role in the region--where Japan faces increasing threats to its security from neighbors China and North Korea--the issue of a security dilemma arises. Prime Minister Suga must work to balance threat response with the cost (both economic and political) of new capabilities, while ensuring that Japan's reactions do not feed into the cycle of escalation and make it worse.

U.S. Targeting China's Access to Semiconductors: Effective Economic Coercion?

For the past year and a half the U.S. has been unilaterally attempting to obstruct China's access to domestic infrastructure and microchip technology through economic coercion by blacklisting Chinese tech companies and wide-reaching export controls. This is due to the U.S.’s concerns that Chinese companies like Huawei could use its installed technology as tools of surveillance on U.S. citizens or even to disrupt the infrastructure of states at the behest of the Chinese government and that imported semiconductor technology is being transferred from private Chinese companies to the Chinese military.

The U.S. took initial action in May of 2019 by designating Huawei to be added to the Export Administration Regulations Entity List. This was effectively a blacklisting of Huawei by the U.S. government.  A second round of export controls - first announced this past May - went into effect earlier this month. These are intended to cut off Huawei from overseas microchip manufacturers by imposing additional restrictions to make it so that foreign microchip suppliers who use U.S. software or technology in the manufacturing process cannot sell their products to Huawei without an export license from the U.S. Department of Commerce.

The U.S.’s export controls on microchips have naturally resulted in China focusing its efforts on the development of its domestic production capabilities.  It appears that the U.S. was not satisfied with just restricting China’s access to imports of microchips, as recent reports indicate that the U.S.’s next target in its unilateral trade campaign is one of China’s top domestic microchip producers, SMIC. The Department of Commerce announced on September 25th that it would be implementing export controls on SMIC which would require a company to obtain an export license in order to continue doing business with them. This measure is motivated by a review from SOS International which states that the sale of technology to SMIC poses “an unacceptable risk of diversion to a military end use in the People’s Republic of China.”  

In the short term these export controls may effectively slow China’s development of microchip production and cut off its access to the global market. However, these measures could have unintended consequences for the U.S. The internationally distributed supply chain of microchips has made it difficult for a nationally focused chip producer like China to effectively carve out its own niche in the market. The U.S. is jeopardizing this advantage with these actions. The Chinese consumer market is the largest in the world for microchips, so although companies will comply with the U.S.'s unilateral measures for now, it is incentivizing the development of technologies and alternative supply chains that circumvent the U.S. 

These export controls are hindering China’s production and development capabilities. However, the U.S.’s measures are adding uncertainty into the market and supply chains of one of its largest exports, and degrading the perceived reliability of U.S. microchip suppliers. While China’s supply of microchips will be hindered in the short term, these trade restrictions are practically conceding the U.S.’s market share to foreign companies.

Russia House My Oh My!

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is challenging Russian intelligence products to reach the White House and President Trump. CIA Director Haspel is cautious about which Russian intelligence products President Trump reads and appears suspicious of the CIA’s “Russia House”, whom she often accuses of purposefully misleading her. Russia House has targets and analysts who are Russian experts. As as result, Director Haspel tasked the CIA’s general counsel, Courtney Elwood, with reviewing Russia House’s intelligence products before they reach the White House. This is a unique strategy as one former CIA lawyer states, it is “unprecedented that a general counsel would be involved to this extent”.

This has reduced the amount of Russian related intelligence from the CIA to the White House and the National Security Council. Coincidently, the CIA began cautiously sending Russian intel to the White House at the start of President Trump’s impeachment proceedings. It is also worth noting a whistleblower complaint from the CIA started the impeachment. This lead to greater mistrust towards Russian-related intelligence among the CIA’s top ranks and the White House. President Trump has recently criticized the intelligence community (IC) for concluding Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election to boost his candidacy. He has also put his loyalists in top IC positions.

Director Haspel has scrutinized Russia House’s intelligence reports. Likewise, The head of Russia House was fired earlier this year. It was clear Director Haspel did not like this head. Another Russia house analyst quit after Director Haspel accused him of lying about intelligence. More recently, Director Haspel dismissed Russia House analysts who showed a correlation between Russia and diplomats with Brian trauma. This first originated in 2017 when Canadian embassy staff in Cuba experienced mysterious health issues.   

The Abraham Accords: An Open Door to Regionalized Terrorism

        Israel and the two Arab Gulf states of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have formally established diplomatic relations with the signing of the "Abraham Accords". Bahrain and the U.A.E. are the third and fourth states to have opened diplomatic relations with Israel following Egypt and Jordan. The "losers" in this deal are clearly the state of Iran and the Palestinians. This official establishment of relations is significant in terms of the precedent it sets for Israeli-Gulf cooperation in the future. However, the written agreement only really reenforces the cooperation which has already been at work for the better part of a decade. The way in which the deal has been covered by the media and the way it is interpreted by the everyday people who live in Middle East I believe is significant to future agreements like this one.

    The United States led coalition in the Middle East has failed in its objective to completely eradicate islamic extremist's ability to spread their ideology and wage terrorist attacks. This over two decade long campaign however has severely limited the resources of these groups. The financial support structure has been fractured and manpower depleted rendering limiting the scope of attacks mainly to Iraq and Syria. The United States is in the process of withdrawing ground troops from the region and has committed to further limiting its engagements in the future. This creates a viable security threat. With the decrease in U.S. influence, terror threats may again grow. We have seen this play out with the strengthening of ISIS and we are reminded that influence of radical jihadists is not limited to the Middle East. In the information age we now find ourselves in it has become easier than ever before to export ideology. This may help those already on the path to radicalization find likeminded individuals, causing numbers to grow. Even with limited financial resources the desire to strike at Western ideals and symbols of power has never been stronger due to the drawn out nature of the conflict. Because of these two factors we can expect to see terror become more regionalized. The ongoing westernization in the U.A.E and Bahrain may be seen as the perfect target to these groups. Their relatively close geographic proximity to regions of unrest in the Middle East and their high concentration of foreigners are also considerable factors. Over eighty percent of citizens of Dubai are expats and similar numbers are true throughout the U.A.E and Bahrain. The large urban developments of Manama, Dubai and Abu Dhabi which are home to large concentrations of European and American companies, banks and international organizations and tourists. This puts them at considerable risk. The signing of the "Abraham Accords" may be the final straw that breaks the camel's  back. Potentially being seen as another betrayal to the West these accords may enrage those extremists seeking to install islamic states throughout the Arab world. Al-Qa'ida and al-Shabaab have made threats in the past against similar regionalized institutions and also strongly oppose the Israeli state. However, the international atmosphere and population of these Arab Gulf states and their location open them up to more threats. No longer limited to Iraq and Syria but now including Yemen, Africa and potential radicalization as close to home as Saudi Arabia or within their own boarders.      

DHS Strategic Planning

Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House eleven days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act. The stand-alone Cabinet-level department became official on March 1, 2003. The department currently has 22 different sub-entities that make up a more integrated DHS with a unified goal towards national security.  DHS's mission includes securing 7,000 miles of border land, 16 critical infrastructure sectors, millions of airline passengers, 328 ports of entry, and much more. DHS's Science and Technology Directorate Strategic Plan 2020-2025 addresses goals, challenges, and their appropriate responses.

DHS's first goal is to "build trusted relationships with customers that support the delivery and adaption of mission-critical solutions". This involves understanding customer operations, priorities, missions, and capability gaps. The second goal is to "excel at a set of core offerings and capabilities that are aligned to customer mission needs". This involves DHS customer testing, evaluation, simulation, and systems engineering. DHS's third goal involves strengthening external partnerships to improve mission priorities. These partnerships include government, academia, industry, and national laboratories. The last goal involves creating dynamic and unified cultures. DHS's matrixed approach enables them to provide the appropriate resources, solutions, and expertise to their customers.  

DHS realizes there are challenges. The first challenge is they serve many customers with diverse missions and operational needs. The Science and Tech response is to further engage with customers to understand these diverse and evolving needs. DHS realizes their customers require timely solutions to achieve missions. Therefore, DHS will further invest in Science and Tech to ensure they are equipped to provide timely solutions. Lastly, DHS's challenges are interdisciplinary and complex. Therefore, DHS wishes to create a unified structure and culture to collaborate and solve these complex problems. 

Only time will tell if DHS is equipped and prepared to combat complex science and technology problems. These rapidly changing industry requires adaptation and immense preparation. It appears they have a strategy. Now, it is time to potentially adapt and secure the homeland.      

North Korean Coercion

In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling wrote about the distinction between 'brute force' (i.e. direct military action) and coercion (the use of threats to deter or compel). Both categories bring to bear their own inherent bargaining power, but methods of coercion have become especially prevalent in recent decades. 

North Korean coercion relies heavily on military activity (although not direct action as of yet), to deter enemy aggression and compel compliance with its demands. Kim Jong Un and government officials regularly announce rocket and ballistic missile tests and progress updates on the state's nuclear program; these actions are meant to instill fear in North Korea's adversaries, while impressing its few allies. Other coercive measures include state visits, limited diplomatic talks, military exercises (both solitary and jointly), and even cyber attacks. China and Russia sometimes add further weight to these coercive measures in their willingness to partner with North Korea, in addition to the economic aid, diplomatic support, and military/law enforcement cooperation they provide.

Before North Korea ever admitted any cases of COVID-19, Russia pledged to send 1500 test kits, and China is easily North Korea's biggest trade partner in terms of imports and exports. The UN had already granted limited sanction relief, but closed borders and an internal lockdown have stopped North Korea from receiving much of the aid its people need; this puts North Korea in a very defensive position. Between the COVID-19 pandemic and North Korea's already aggressive, isolationist habits, the U.S. and other states seeking denuclearization and regional stability through diplomatic means may have trouble negotiating with the beleaguered communist state. North Korea's government will prioritize strength and self-reliance, and continue to push for threatening (and destabilizing) tests, exercises, and progress reports that are part of its coercive toolkit. 

The Types of Coercion and Deterrence

 

Chapter two of the Rand Corporation’s Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations is entitled “The Theory of Coercion”. This chapter discusses deterrence and three types of coercion: accommodation, punishment, and denial. Accommodation coercion is often called positive deterrence because it offers incentives for complying with coercive demands. For example, the U.S. may tell Germany if they do not acquire oil from Russia, then the U.S. will provide Germany with additional military support and weapons. Punishment involves threatening to impose great costs on an adversary if the adversary does not comply with the demands. This often involves threatening to kill combat troops or harming civilians. What is important is the target is something the adversary values. Coercion by denial involves convincing the adversary resisting demands will be unproductive. This may vary depending on an adversary’s strategy. Coercion by denial’s notable trait is hopelessness. A common example includes threatening to defeat an adversary on the battlefield.  

This chapter also discusses deterrence, extended deterrence, and the differences between strategic and tactical deterrence. Deterrence is often referred as "the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he/[she] might take to outweigh its benefits". Extended deterrence is deterring attacks against external interests and allies instead of direct attacks against the deterring target. Most military strategist use strategic deterrence, which involves efforts to a state’s behavior to change in the international arena. Tactical deterrence involves an individual or small group’s immediate behavior. Police officers often use tactical deterrence. Peacekeeping operations often use tactical deterrence, which can have outcomes with important strategic implications. 

Similar to deterrence, compellence looks to make the target change its behavior according to a coercer’s demands. Common goals include withdrawing from disputed territory, surrendering, or halting an invasion. Compellence and deterrence have some differences. Successful threats do not have to be carried out in compellence. However, violence is often used to make open-ended threats. This is risky, because adversaries can then chose how long to resist a coercer’s demands and increase the compellence costs.  

Wildfires + COVID = Struggles for the US

 The current state of the Pacific Northwest is in fact a national security threat. U.S. national security policymakers and practitioners should be working to find possible solutions to the national disaster crisis. The rampant wildfires that are plaguing that area of the United States are negatively impacting the air in that region and could possibly impact the rest of the country as well. When combined with COVID-19, which has major health concerns especially with the respiratory system, the poor air quality is presenting a national security issue for at least that small part of the country. “An unprecedented level of pollution” is being dispersed throughout this region of America (USA TODAY). Since the US does not know what the long-term health concerns of COVID-19 are combining respiratory issues and poor air quality could in fact lead to more health concerns in the future. 

            These wildfires a threat to our national security because they are destroying national resources and effecting the livelihood of American citizens. A large number of firefighters have been tasked with trying to lessen the effect of these wildfires, but they have not been able to completely eliminate these fires. Oregon has been essentially completely covered by the smoke and pollution from these fires. Air quality is at such a hazardous level that the Department of Environmental Quality has dubbed it as “apocalyptic”. Not only have there been national resources destroyed, but there have also been economic challenges. Local economies have suffered and there is not a general consensus of what it would take for these economies to rebound. Therefore, this does present an immediate threat to national security. 

These fires have not been without causalities either, as of this weekend at least 30 people have died. As previously mentioned, coupling these confirmed deaths with the future health concerns and the destruction of US national resources these wildfires are presenting a legitimate national security concern. The response from the government must be thoroughly thought out, and they should do a strategic plan as well. Being strategic in this sense is something that will most likely challenge the current administration. 

Keeping Your Eye on the Ball: The Cautionary Tales of Sicily and Iraq

    Thucydides’ recounting of the disastrous Sicilian Expedition is a tale of military hubris and misguidance. Athens decided to send a military expedition to attack the Sicilian state of Syracuse, far removed from the theater of its ongoing war with Sparta. The result was a disastrous defeat for the Athenian navy, and a cautionary tale unfortunately retold by the United States during its War on Terror and subsequent invasion of Iraq.

    The Athenians and Americans shared similar arguments for their entry into war, both great military powers defending themselves from the attacks of perceived weaker opponents. As Sparta wished to dissipate the regional hegemony of Athens, so too did Al Qaeda wish to expel the United States from their region. The Athenians and Americans responded to the aggression of Sparta and Al Qaeda through direct military force. The wars began favorably for both these great powers. Athens threw off Spartan attacks and raided the Peloponnesian coasts, and the United States toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan.

    However,  the Athenians and Americans made a critical mistake after these initial successes, namely the diversion of their attention to secondary conflicts tangential at best to the strategic objectives of their wars. 

    As Nicias attempted to dissuade the Athenian expedition to Sicily, so too did American generals express skepticism towards the underplayed difficulty of their invasion into Iraq and adequate force size, but hotter heads prevailed in both cases. What resulted for the Athenians and the Americans were abject strategic failures. The Sicilian Expedition served as the turning point for the Peloponeseian war and spelled Athens’ eventual doom as its naval posture was weakened and Sicily was pushed to ally itself with Sparta. Of course the United States did not meet so dire a fate, but its bungling invasion of Iraq represents just as much of a strategic failure. As Athens' failed expedition led to its loss of the Peloponnesian War, so too did the United States' mishandling of the Iraq invasion prevent any hope of victory in its War on Terror. What was envisioned as a weeks-long invasion resulted in a collapsed state and an expansion of violent insurgencies in the Middle East with an end no nearer in sight to this day.

    As the United States’ continues the drawdown of military forces in the Middle East, we must critically examine the successes and failures of the War on Terror. Chief among these stands the disastrous United States intervention into Iraq whose failure echoes that of Athens’ two millennia earlier. In each case, a great power - whether through hubris, military miscalculation, or cultural ignorance - lost sight of their primary enemy and engaged in tangential conflicts that fatally compromised their strategic objectives. As tensions continue to build between the United States and its adversaries once again, let’s hope that the United States may at least be able to learn from its own mistakes if not from those that came before it.

Why Read Thucydides In 2020

Thucydides wrote "The History of The Peloponnesian War" in 431 BC. So why should we care thousands of years later. Carsten Schmeidl, a Senior Program Officer in the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program, thinks U.S. strategic thinkers can learn from Thucydides. The U.S. must now consider this modern era of multiple great powers. Globalization has also made the world rather unpredictable. Nations such as China and Russia are looking to rise and become a threat to the U.S. and its allies. For example, China is greatly expanding its Navy. These various powerful nations are looking to gain relative advantages. The Peloponnesian War was no different. Athens was a maritime power and protected its people by securing port access. This allowed them to acquire grain supplies from the Black Sea. 

Great strategists and leaders look to gain a mental advantage and give their enemies heartbreak. Athen's leader, Pericles, had a strategy to convince Sparta it was powerless compared to Athens. They first made Athens impenetrable by securing long walls and retreating behind them. Secondly, Athens launched naval raids to annoy Sparta. They knew Sparta was a powerful land enemy and did not want to engage Sparta on land. 

However, the changing world greatly impacted Athens. Athens suffered a plague and nearly 33% of Athenians died. They also didn't vary their strategies much. While Athens's navy kept them surviving, they relied too much on their naval power.

U.S. strategic thinkers can learn several lessons. Strategies are not perfect as many states have finite resources and budget constraints. Money may not be concerning in the U.S., but how they utilize the budget and resources does matter. Athens's navy gave it a relative. However, this came with hubris. Strategists must think broadly and think about various strategies. Therefore, there is a backup plan if a major strength fails. Lastly, U.S. strategists should look to set the theatre. This involves the pre-crisis environment in which strategic decision occurs. A good example includes alliances. Persia joined and greatly impacted the Peloponnesian war. likewise, the U.S. benefits from favorable alliances and military support.  

Covid-19 Pandemic V. National Interests

 In the world we live in now there are many interests that we hold as valuable to our survival, such as, our health and medical research associated. However, when our health is being threatened by a virus from a country, what do we do? Medical research and advancements have been spearheaded since the beginning of time. For instance, George Washington inoculated his troops with the small pox vaccine so that they would have a resistance. We have held our ability to fight off diseases in very high regards and our ability to save as many lives as possible. 

The U.S. Public Health Service was created in order to help citizens of America be able to live their day to day lives without the constant worry of illness and pandemics constantly. However, now we are seeing with Covid-19 that the government may not always had what is best for the American people truly at hand. It is has come to a point of disarray where we are constantly being lied to by our government and are being misinformed all along the way. We have been receiving reports that speak of large numbers of people are dying from a pandemic that we cannot even get a straight answer on how to protect ourselves from as individuals from this virus. There is not even a straight answer on how the virus was able to spread so far and why protocols were not put in place as soon as China had cases pouring in.

            This pandemic threatens us on a national level because it threatens are very existence as a nation. It threatens our lives, our family’s lives, and threatens our way of life. So many citizens within the US do not carry health insurance, which means no one was testing up until recent months. Which between lack of testing, lack of reporting, and clear lack of responsibility has allowed for further spread and contamination of the virus, which has brought us to where we are now. By threatening our very existence we are having our survival challenged, which means one of our core values that we hold dear is being threatened at the very same time. As a nation healthcare is as valued as warfare and defense. With our health, numbers, and resources depleted and distracted it leaves us open to further spreads and even possible attacks. 

Where is the Strategist's Place?

Strategy results from the combination of four elements (according to Lykke): ends, ways, means, and risk. In other words, it translates courses of action (often by military means) into political objectives, through the allocation of resources and minimization of risk. The strategic end goals of this equation are the political objectives, or policies, dictated by Congress and the White House to agency heads, both civilian and military. Policy governs strategy, but it is up to these agency heads to work through the ways, means, and risk involved. The system then relies on healthy civil-military relations to optimize U.S. options under each policy.  

Unfortunately, the increasing complexities and growing divide one finds in U.S. civil-military relations pose a challenge to the U.S. capacity for grand strategy. This governmental divide between civilian policymakers and military officials stems from organizational and cultural differences in their respective agencies and command structures. For one, policymakers cannot always anticipate every situation with long-term policy needs. But in the absence of policy, the situation may be urgent enough to require direction anyway; that is when other officials and analysts must step in (and even make educated guesses) to keep the strategy machine going. 

This civil-military divide forms a dichotomy that the U.S. continues to find difficulties traversing. But solid strategic thinking is less of a dichotomy than balancing in the middle of a wide-ranging spectrum. Characteristics and attributes of strategists along this spectrum include: being historically-minded but future-oriented; thinking analytically and creatively; having both practical expertise and knowledge of theory; and being simultaneously apolitical and politically savvy. Good strategists--whether civilian or military, policymaker or analyst--must find a balance between these attributes in order to find a place in and best contribute to U.S. grand strategy aspirations.