The
recent attempts at détente between Iran and the U.S. over economic sanctions
and nuclear capabilities revive the question of how U.S. foreign policy should
approach this thaw in relations. Should
the U.S. pursue a policy of containment, first outlined in George Kennan’s long
telegram, or should the U.S. approach Iran in nuclear talks?
Is
containment a viable foreign policy option for the U.S. today and is Iran even comparable
to the Soviet Union during the Cold War?
While there have yet to be any real breakthroughs, the U.S. has already
held two days of nuclear negotiation talks with Iran. Iran has maintained that they are not seeking
the capability to produce atomic bombs. However, they have consistently “defied U.N. Security Council demands that ithalt enrichment and other sensitive nuclear activities, leading to multiplerounds of crippling international sanctions that have reduced Iranian oilexports, caused inflation to soar and the value of the Iranian rial currency toplummet.” On a more positive note, Iran
did issue a joint statement with the six world powers saying that Tehran aims
to defuse “longstanding suspicions over the nature of its nuclear program”.
While the U.S. policy of Soviet containment was successful
over a forty-year period and ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991,
containment was pursued under far different circumstances and against a vastly
different enemy.
The Soviet Union had a well-developed military capable of
helping defeat Nazi Germany whereas Iran was not able to defeat Iraq over an
eight-year period in the 1980s. The
Soviet Union had thousands of strategically placed nuclear weapons able to
destroy the U.S. whereas Iran does not have the brainpower or resources within
itself to expand its nuclear program (they greatly rely on foreign assistance
in this area). The Soviet Union held
enormous political power and was the center of a communist ideology supported
by a third of the world’s population whereas the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran
hardly has the support of two percent of the world’s population. The Soviet Union was rational in its foreign
policy, negotiated with the West, and withdrew forces where it could not
succeed, whereas Iran does not maintain diplomatic relations with others,
supports terrorism, conducts cyber attacks on the West, and makes no secret of
its desire to destroy Israel. The Soviet
threat was far removed and would take time to reach its intended target,
whereas Iran’s targets are within hundreds of miles. Educated men with a rational international
viewpoint made up the Kremlin leadership, whereas radical mullahs with a
limited perspective make up the Iranian elite.
It is worth noting that a policy of containment with the
educated and rational Soviet Union almost ended in nuclear war over Cuba. Would that same policy of containment succeed
against an economically, militarily, and politically weak Iran led by radical
mullahs who have consistently operated as a rogue state? If containment were the course of action the
U.S. pursued, it would allow a rogue state to take risky gambles not taken by
rational actors. It would also increase
the likelihood of an unintended or accidental nuclear launch if Iran truly had
that capability and presumed to be under attack.
While Kennan’s containment of the Soviet Union was
successful, it does not seem to be the best course of action for the U.S.
because Iran is not the same adversary that the Soviets were. As
the U.S. is beginning to engage in talks with Iran the issues that have proven
to be a stumbling block in the past must be resolved to ease economic
sanctions, most notably the scope of Iran’s nuclear enrichment labs and any
stockpile of nuclear material it has produced. While U.S. ally Israel is pushing for Iran to
stop all nuclear enrichment, the U.S. and its negotiating partners (Britain, France,
Germany, Russia, and China) are seeking to limit enrichment levels, preventing
them from reaching the grade needed for nuclear weapons. Iran does not want to ship its uranium
stockpiles abroad while the U.S. would like to agree upon a long-term plan to
ship the enriched stockpile material to foreign countries.
Besides those issues, there are many details that will
determine if negotiations are successful.
Iran will have to accept the
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol, which means letting the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have access to Iran’s “undeclared”
nuclear sites. Iran’s conservative
Revolutionary Guard and Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, will be the actors
who will have to provide the most flexibility when it comes to
negotiations. Even if a deal can be
reached President Obama will have to persuade Congress to ease sanctions, which
would also create friction with Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu.
While it remains unclear what these negotiations with Iran
will bring and whether or not the final outcome will create a nuclear-free Iran
or a world that learns to live with Iran’s enrichment program, the follow up
talks slated to be held in Geneva on November 7th-8th
promise to bring a seriousness and substance that has never before been seen in
U.S. relations with Iran.
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