How “European” is Britain? The question goes back at least as far as “Splendid Isolation” and arguably all the way to the reign of Henry VIII. The answer has always been some variation on “kind of,” but today an official response came a bit closer as the Labour Shadow Europe Secretary, Jim Murphy, suggested that Britain should at some point hold an in-or-out referendum on EU membership. Though the official Labour Party stance on Europe is that Britain should remain in the Union, such a statement from a high-ranking party member suggests that the Labour bulwark against the EU referendum may be coming under strain.
Britain and Europe have always had
an unusual relationship. The UK played the role of balancer long before the
foundation of the European Union and maintains significant sway within the EU
despite its half-in, half-out policy. Euro-skepticism gained extraordinary
force under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher who clawed back huge amounts
of British contributions to European funds and famously said “no, no, no!” to
the single currency. Since that time, strains in the UKs involvement in Europe have
grown more and more pronounced. Britain was forced to leave the ESM, has clung
to its many opt-outs, and has resisted virtually all attempts at European
political integration. This has led to a whole host of descriptors for the
Britain-EU relationship.
Describe it however you want -- “two-tier,”
“two-speed,” “multi-track,” -- Europe and Britain must settle their stances
once and for all. Though any referendum will be held after the dust of the EU
debt crisis storm settles, both sides now seem to know it is coming. Europe
knows it must demand what it can expect from the UK, and the UK knows that it
must either accept a higher profile in Europe or abdicate its role entirely.
Perhaps to go out to the green pastures of the randomly-still-extant EEA.
The
coming decision bears a whole range of consequences for the United States
regardless of the outcome. America has accepted the European Union as an
important institutional guarantor of peace on the continent. It restrained
Germany (even once united), promoted interdependence, and spread norms which
tamped down dangerous nationalist tendencies across the board. The British
referendum may throw the balance out of kilter.
One of
the elements that made the EU tolerable to America is that it has never been
particularly united. France and Germany tend to be wary of each other, and the
United Kingdom could always be depended upon to throw a wrench in the works if
the federal project seemed to be gaining too much steam. However, once the
British are in or out, their single biggest trump card is gone; they can no
longer threaten to leave. The UK will lose much or all of its ability to affect
institutional formation within the EU, potentially leading to greater European
fiscal, financial, and political integration or to dissolution of the EU under
the many internal pressures which Britain has historically helped to mitigate
through its unique position. Both options are anathema to an America aimed at
maintaining the status quo.
Europe
without Britain may also be dangerously tilted towards Germany. Much as has
been seen oh, twice, before, an increasingly muscular Germany seems to be able to
overcome balancing by France and other members. Leaving mighty Germany to
exercise outsize control over the whole of the European continent through supranational
institutions and its own purse strings is also against American hegemonic
interests.
Lastly,
there are the more direct threats and gains for the USA. The “special
relationship” is real and valuable. Unity and cultural affinity within the
English-speaking world have been extraordinarily economically and politically
productive. This productivity is based on the Anglo-American relationship. As
two of the only rich countries with major reserve currencies, the ability to
project military power, and global socio-political economic reach, the US and
Britain do a great deal to enhance each other’s power. Though the UK has rarely
done America’s bidding without question, it has been content to play the role
of junior partner.
If
Britain votes in favour [sic] of membership, it may well find itself drawn out
of America’s orbit. If it votes out, the United States may well benefit from
still more sway as European support for Britain becomes optional. Indeed,
Margaret Thatcher and a great many Tories were fond of suggesting NAFTA: the
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement. But this outcome remains far from certain; Britain may choose to use its newly free hand to excercise a more independent foreign policy.
The
vote is still a way off, and a lot can change. But with Labour beginning to
come on board, it’s beginning to appear on the horizon at last. Europe and the
United Kingdom know it must, and probably look forward to the catharsis
whatever the outcome. What is certain is that America’s change-averse foreign
policy establishment won’t find anything cathartic about it at all.
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