Walzer and the Topic of Omission

I wanted to discuss this topic and it application to the Walzer text before the class moved on to the strategy bit of the coursework. As I read through the book I was reminded of the concept of the sin of omission. This is an explicitly religious concept most closely associated with Catholicism, but I think it bears mentioning within the context of Walzer’s book and the larger, secular debate about just and unjust war. To commit a sin of omission is to choose inaction when you can do something or you ought to do something. St. Thomas Aquinas, who Walzer refers to early on in the book, writes in Summa Theologica, “Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated above; because it is a non-fulfillment of a good of virtue.” Here we have an indication from one of the philosophical giants that freely choosing to not act stands counter to justice.

If it follows that an action can be categorized as either just or unjust, then a corresponding inaction is subject to the same appraisal. To use an example from the text, if the Indian government was justified in intervening on the part of the Bengalis to stop Pakistani violence, would a decision to not intervene be considered an unjust act? Walzer does not give the idea of omission much, if any attention. I consider this a shortcoming of his overall argument, particularly in regards to his take on insufferable, genocidal strife.

On the subject of interventions Walzer proposes a self-help test. This would provide a country with the ability to choose inaction and still be justified in doing so provided there was this political tenuousness, but Walzer closes this loophole. He writes that when the crimes against humanity are so profane “that it makes talk of community or self-determination or ‘arduous struggle’ seem cynical and irrelevant, that is, in case of enslavement or massacre,” (pg. 90) a country can and must act. He says later that massacres make self-help tests a non-issue. He explains further that militarily defeating perpetrators of such an act is “morally necessary” and that, “Any state capable of stopping the slaughter has a right, at least, to try to do so” (pg. 106-108).

So where does this leave the U.S. in terms of its conduct of foreign policy? Have we not pursued what is “morally necessary” in the past, and does that constitute an injustice? I speak most specifically with regard to Rwanda and Darfur, but our reluctance to get involved in the Balkans is also worth noting. I ask this question not to be preachy but instead to highlight one thing in particular: if you want to inject the moral precepts and concepts of justice into the foreign policy debate and debunk realism, this is an important issue of contention. Walzer seems to argue that deeming something politically intractable (a typical defense for staying out of Darfur) is not sufficient when dealing with genocide or massacre, but I found the text decidedly mute and at best vague on the topic of inaction.

As an intellectual exercise, talking about justice and war is certainly beneficial, and Walzer is to be praised for articulately taking on as much subject matter as he did. But in terms of national security policy, such ruminations inevitably inject vagueness into the decision making process. The three examples in the preceding paragraph were (or are) all nauseating and gruesome to confront, but hesitation on the part of policy makers to not beat back abject, organized violence outside of its own territory is, in many cases, the prudent decision. Many disagree (most prominently Samantha Power), and Walzer might be one of them, I just can’t get that from the text.

As a spinoff question: does the prospect of “justice after war” mitigate the immorality of inaction? I think the quick answer is yes, but I have not given it much thought.

RESTREPO

If we let people see that kind of thing, there would never again be any war. -Pentagon official explaining why the U.S. military censored footage from the Gulf War

In 2007, seasoned war reporters Tim Hetherington and Sebastian Junger embedded with Second Platoon, Battle Company, 173rd Airborne during their deployment to the Korengal Valley, Afghanistan, which at the time was the deadliest place on earth for American soldiers. They documented Second Platoon's experience and were published in a sobering and excellent January 2008 Vanity Fair article which (in complete seriousness) should be required reading for all citizens of the United States.

During their time with Second Platoon, they also kept a video camera rolling and this past summer released a documentary titled RESTREPO, after the outpost Second Platoon built and defended during the length of their deployment. The film, which has been showing at the Kentucky Theater all week and will be released on DVD and Blue Ray on November 30, has been met with rave reviews and won the Sundance Film Festival's Best Documentary award this year. Here's a good Huffington Post article written in this past June about the film.

What's that? You don't think you'll watch the film? Why should you see this film, you ask? Because you are an American, that's why. You say this sort of stuff doesn't interest you? Good one. I can think of no better way to insult our soldiers than to say that. It's too graphic, too sad, war stuff bothers me. Please let me run and get you a tissue. Bothers you? The soldiers of Second Platoon lived 15 months what you'll see for a brief 90-minutes. Their friends were shot and killed as they watched on. They, now, today, as I write this, take sleeping pills, anti-depressants, have nightmares, feel injuries, run pictures through their minds... their experiences at OP RESTREPO will never leave them. And they did what they did, and what they continue to do, defending you. That's right, you.

You may think RESTREPO is just a film, but it's not. It's way more than a film or a movie. It is 90 minutes of reality for thousands of US soldiers who have fought and died since 2001 to protect our nation and our people. RESTREPO lives every moment in the minds of those who have seen combat and lost dear friends. It should stir emotions in you, it should hurt you... it is their reality, each and every day.

What does all this have to do with our National Security Policy class? It's simple. The disconnect between our public and our military is vast and tears at the very fabric of our country's foundation. Nothing could be more dangerous to our national security than to have an uninformed public who elects leadership that does not understand the costs and consequences of war. RESTREPO seeks to start to bridge that gap. The film is not political. You'll notice not one politician or diplomat is interviewed during the film, only the soldiers directly related to Second Platoon. RESTREPO is the soldier's experience alone, and thus, a window for the public to see the direct, real results of our country's policy actions, carried out everyday. Agree with the war or not, this film shows reality and leaves you to decide the rest.

Ernest Hemingway reminds us to "never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime."

If you read this post and do not subsequently take action to increase your understanding of what our soldiers go through in Afghanistan, then my friend, you are part of the problem. Plain and simple. The greatest threat to our national security is the ignorance and apathy of our people. Go see RESTREPO.

North Korean Déjà- Vu

While three blog entries in a row about North Korea may be a little much, I couldn’t help but feel inspired after seeing Team America’s Kim make an appearance and yet feel a little disappointed that Matt Damon was left out. Anyway, a different look at the predictability of North Korea’s actions has been laid out by Sung-Yoon Lee in Foreign Affairs. Lee points out the consistency of methods used by the North since Kim Il Sung emerged as the dictator for life in the early 1960s. The strategy goes like this: “lash out at its enemies when it perceives them to be weak or distracted (regional or world powers makes little difference), up the ante in the face of international condemnation (while blaming external scapegoats), and then negotiate for concessions in return for an illusory promise of peace.” Military and political brinkmanship have been tactics deployed at will to gain leverage with its rivals due to the North’s inability to compete economically.

Examples of North Korea’s game plan date back to 1968 when a 31 man commando team snuck into South Korea to assassinate President Park Chung Hee while the US concentrated on the ever increasing turmoil in Vietnam. The attempt failed but two days later the North captured a U.S. intelligence ship in international waters and held the crew captive for 11 months until the Johnson administration issued an apology. North Korea was internationally condemned throughout the 11 months, yet continued to send troops into the South and even shot down a U.S. Reconnaissance plane the following year. The lessons learned by North Korea in this sequence of events were that its provocations and attacks on the U.S. and South Korea would lead to the democratic regimes seeking to ease tensions.

In 1972, Kim demanded peace talks with the South for the first time since the Korean War in hopes of establishing an agreement to remove all U.S. troops from the South. This of course only came after the U.S. and China came together the previous year and was swiftly followed by more offensive operations against South Korea.

Fast forward to the next American war and the same pattern emerges. Long range missiles were test fired over Japan on July 4, 2006, followed by their first nuclear test. This led to further UN sanctions and a reversal of President Bush’s policy of financial pressure toward nuclear negotiations. North Korea promised to eradicate its nuclear arsenal and in return, the U.S. unfroze illicit funds, resumed food and fuel aid, and removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Now in 2010, the pattern persists. The Obama administration has its hands full and the North is hopeful for quick concessions after long range missile tests in 2009. The UN resolution passed in response to the Chenoan sinking pleased the North as it was very weakly worded and led Kim to suggest he would be willing to return to multilateral nuke talks. Foreign Affairs predicts that another missile demonstration should be on the way in the near future as the cycle of provocation, deception, and retreat continues. The U.S. would be wise to not follow the North around the merry-go-round this time. The Obama administration is showing that it has paid attention to the North’s playbook and will focus on strengthening financial sanctions, targeting it’s counterfeiting, money laundering, and other illicit activities instead. It should spotlight the North’s human rights violations, and I would also add that it should take several avenues of approach to increase the free flow of outside information to the general populace as we wait to see who will follow in Kim’s place.

Maintaining our defensive posture in South Korea, resisting the urge to be drawn into a military confrontation, encouraging the Chinese to pry open the doors for humanitarian aid to the North, and keeping the pressure on the government leadership should be the top priorities for now. The future of North Korea’s political leadership and stability is uncertain but if the past is any indication, the game plan will remain the same.

Oh Herro Status Quo

While we’re on the subject of North Korea I want to introduce the Economist's recent article to the debate. To save yourself the time reading it the bottom line is that following the Cheonan incident relations between North and South Korea worsened considerably, but the South Koreans are hinting a return to the “sunshine policy” of the old days by sending $8.5 million of aid north. I catch myself wondering what the hell is going on. And then I remember that this back-and-forth is what normal is.

In the last six months the North Koreans have sunk a South Korean ship; South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has proposed a “unification tax” to cover the expected astronomical costs of unifying the country once North Korea collapses (in the presumed near-future); North Korea’s Number Two told a gathering of the country’s military elite that the peninsula was on the ‘brink of war’ (since when has it not been?); President Myung-bak hinted at hopes to expand commercial ties with North Korea through the construction of a second industrial factory park; and last Wednesday the North proposed the first military talks in two years, the South pushed the date back to September 30^th from the North’s suggestion of the 24^th.

In August flash flooding displaced tens of thousands of people along the North Korea/China border. It is strange how floods and other similar disasters bring out the humanitarian in us all, while we get numb to and ignore after a bit “normal” day-to-day suffering. These floods are the backdrop to Seoul’s aid offer which Pyongyang has yet to respond to. The Christian Science Monitor seems to think that North Korea will accept the South’s offer since aid from China has not materialized.

Let’s assume that North Korea will indeed take South Korea’s offer of aid, which would then return that part of the status quo to its previous position (South Korean had frozen all government funds to the North in mid-May after the Cheonan kerfuffle). The Economist notes that there are more than just humanitarian concerns wrapped up in the idea of aid. Political and diplomatic considerations are also in play. Apparently Mr. Lee’s previously toughening stance toward the North has been weakened some by his party’s poor showing in the local elections in June. South Koreans may hate Kim Jung-Il, but aren’t exactly calling for war and “have no appetite for punishing” their northern kin.

And what is the role of China? Kim Jung-Il’s recent trip to China with his son resulted in rumors of his son’s rise to future Dearest Leader but not a word on aid to the flooded border area. The Chosun Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper cites a defector from the north as having said that the flood victims were expecting good news to come of Kim Jung-Il’s China trip. Upon his return the North Korean media (read: mouthpiece of the government) made no mention – indicating that whatever aid China offered fell way short of expectation. The Economist is interpreting China’s reluctance on aid as a coercive political maneuver, though they use kinder words. By remaining reluctant on aiding the North Koreans the Chinese are pushing Pyongyang toward the south for assistance. Big Brother is pushing little stepbrother to play nice(er) in order to be rewarded.

President Jimmy Carter (one of your options for rescue should you decide to visit North Korea and be asked not-so-nicely to stay for a while) recently published an op-ed in the New York Times. Carter gets the vibe from North Korea that they want to get back to the pre-March atmosphere and restart negotiations and discussions of denuclearization. I question this conclusion, especially because the North Korean leadership (not Mr. Kim, he was convieniently in China at the time) said that the six-party talks were like being “sentenced to death but not yet executed.” Not exactly a rousing endorsement of beginning the process anew.

If anything the status quo will be returned. In a way North Korea benefits from being seen as unpredictable. South Korea will continue to offer the north aid along with chastisements, the North Koreans will continue to play along and then act out just to prove they can and then play along some more. China will sit back and watch, only getting involved of the situation threatens to spill over. Despite talk of a “unification tax” South Korea would be unwise to hope for the North’s collapse anytime soon. Such an event would destabilize the region and could be a bigger threat to South Korea than Dearest Leader has ever been, even when he’s playing with his nuclear toys.

I guess all I have now is a question for the rest of you... do you think this whole North/South Korea situation will ever change in our lifetimes? Certainly something will happen when Kim Jung-Il bites the dust but there's no telling when that will happen (or if he's already a cyborg zombie). So, status quo forever?

Schelling, Scheonan & Schorpedoes

I did not want to be the first to post a blog, but as we are nearly a month into the semester and no one has yet to blog, it seems I was not the only one with that idea.Dramatics surrounding the sinking of the Cheonan have settled over the summer despite the oddly schizophrenic rhetoric coming out of Seoul. This week President Lee publicly expressed his hopes for reconciliation between North and South despite enraged calls for ramping up UN sanctions against Pyongyang just a few short months ago.

Amid the otherwise lull on the issue, Time Magazine in the August 30 issue quoted a SecDef slip of the tongue (or not if you are of the opinion that Gates is a deliberate man) regarding a possible motivation for the sinking. It was one that I have yet to hear. Who knows whether or not there is any intelligence to suggest there is any truth to the implication, but circumstances and the values surrounding the regime in North Korea made me think “hey, that makes some sense.” Maybe it is just the conspiracy junky in me, but the suggestion that the sinking of the Cheonan was some kind of military rite of passage for “Dear Leader’s” son and successor caught my attention.

If this were true—Junior set out (or was pushed) to prove to daddy that he is worthy of not only his unconditional love but also his throne and those shaft shades—then where does this “act of military provocation”, as South Korea’s Lee initially declared it, fall in the politics of violence: coercion or deterrence?

Coercion would require that the attack was meant to elicit a response. This is not limited to military reaction. It is unlikely that North Korea would want to bait South Korea into another Korean war. Kim Jong Il would be a fool to… never mind. There are also potential desired responses in the diplomatic arena. Dear Leader and his closest friends have been living off of a steady diet of nuclear hush money for some time now. The usual game is the DPRK starts talking about its nuclear program and then promises to make some concession on its desire to be taken serious as a nuclear power in exchange for some aid money (which buys a lot of Hennessy). Or more recently, American hostages are taken, forcing the US to give legitimacy to his authority by sending special envoys featuring former US presidents.

Sinking the Cheonan is a step up in that it involves more risk than the past attention seeking behavior. It is a risk to both compeller and compellee. The risk to North Korea is that South Korea and friends might respond in kind with violence—a capacity for which South Korea outweighs North Korea. The risk for South Korea entails a scenario where the violence escalates into another Korean war with China and the US play the puppeteer roles. World War III just so Generalissimo’s lil Cub Scout can earn his battle badge. Whether this little exercise was designed to incite war or appeasement depends on how sane one deems Kim to be.

Deterrence is much simpler in that it grants slightly more rationality to North Korean leadership—present and future. Simply, it was the first exercise of probable others asserting the heir-apparent’s military prowess to ensure that no one gets any ideas about Korean unification when Senior hands over power. Not to mention a “stay out of my back yard” warning for future military exercises in the area. Since the US denied a ROK request to include the USS George Washington for their posturing exercise near the original sinking site, I’d say this deterrence was at least moderately effective.

It all depends on motivation. The fact that no one seems to know the how the message was intended to be received is an indication that whether deterrence or compellence—the message failed. Or maybe the confused diplomatic fallout is a double win for North Korea. The lesson most in the US gleamed is that Kim Jong Il is irrational…or crazy—crazy like a fox.

The Time Magazine article titled it as “North Korea’s Mafia Moment” relating the corvette sinking to throwing a brick through a window. I would equate it more as the act of a petulant child who bites the neighbor kid to get the otherwise occupied parents to come running into the room. I suppose that is compellence in its most infantile form.

Final Exam

Final Exam
DIP 600: National Security Policy
December 14, 2009

Please answer one of the following three questions. Submit your exam by e-mail to Dr. Farley (farls0@gmail.com) by 12:45pm today.

1. Since 2001, the United States has taken several steps to reorganize and modernize its national security apparatus. Has this effort gone far enough, or too far? What additional steps would you recommend in order to reform the US national security establishment to face the threats of the post-Cold War world?
2. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, the President described a relationship between US military power and the health of the international system. Did you find his argument compelling? Would a substantial decline in US military power herald a collapse of the modern, globalized international structure?
3. According to a recent Pew poll, 44% of the American people now believe that China is the world’s leading economic power. What are the implications of this belief for US national strategy and foreign policy? Feel free to take the accuracy (or lack thereof) of the belief into consideration.

Sanctions: not helping the US with the public in Iran

"We do have concerns about the situation in Iran. We’ve condemned the violence against those who are peacefully expressing their right to their political views. And we understand that there are some political challenges in Iran right now because of Iran’s refusal to respect the right of the people to express their views. You’ve heard what the President said that we’re – we have this offer on the table, this offer of engagement. At the same time, we have another track besides the engagement track, the track of pressure. As it becomes clearer that Iran is unable to make a positive response to this offer of engagement, we’re going to start looking more and more to the pressure track." Ian Kelly, Department Spokesmen, U.S. State Department, December 11, 2009

Though dialogue hasn't perhaps gone to plan, it is hard to believe that anyone thought that simply by talking to Iran for a few minutes would end decades-long issues. Patience must be the highlighted virtue, as well as shedding old ideas such as sanctions.

What if we opened trade with Iran? If Obama continues to threaten non-effective sanctions we will only get the same results we’ve ever had. If he is truly “willing to go the extra mile with regard to diplomacy” as we’ve heard countless times (this particular quotation by Undersecretary Robert Wood during the November 20 State Dept briefing), then with that extra step we should be creative. By imposing sanctions we aren’t changing or stepping anywhere because there is little for us to take away until we give something first. Sanctions, such as the one to be discussed in Congress come January, can only create a rallying point against the United States in Iran.

If we lift sanctions and encourage bilateral trade, Iran, its people and economy would be able to see what the United States as less of a threat. Think of it: we could start a pistachio craze! Import amazing rugs! Trade probably wouldn’t start between the US and Iran, but our allies who have stood with us through years of unsuccessful sanctioning. This would allow not only their oil and gas markets to mend and even thrive, but can create trust on a multilateral level essential for peaceful negotiations. It will be these talks and agreements that will eventually allow the world to feel safer with Iran. No matter how much we speak of pressure, the United States should understand that there can't be instant results.

Rethinking MONUC

With nearly 20,000 troops and a yearly price tag of $1.4 billion, MONUC (a French acronym for Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo) is the largest and most expensive UN mission in the world. Yet it continues to represent the antithesis of successful peacekeeping missions. It's two previous mandates have instructed MONUC to support the efforts of the Congolese military - with food and fuel supplies and logistical support - to root out Hutu rebels in eastern Congo. Later this month, the UN Security Council will take up the decision on whether to renew MONUC's mandate. If it does, it will mark the third time the Security Council has voted to continue peacekeeping support for Congolese military operations over the objections of human rights-based groups worldwide.

In recent weeks, several damaging reports of have surfaced, including a leaked internal document by a UN-mandated Group of Experts. The leaked report revealed that despite efforts to provide transparency in the Congolese mineral trade, illicit trade in tin and gold continues to finance rebel groups. Additionally, the FDLR, which consists of remnants from the Hutu-based groups that carried out the 1994 Rwandan genocide, continues to receive support from regional and international networks, with FDLR executives operating freely in Europe and North American and small arms and financial contributions pouring in from states like Spain and Ukraine. Much more shockingly, the report concluded that the UN mission not only failed to neutralize the FDLR. It exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern Congo.

According to various human rights groups, the Congolese army has committed numerous atrocities, including the murder of hundreds of civilians and the gang-rape of women and girls in the eastern provinces. Moreover, many these atrocities are being carried out in a brutal manner reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide, with victims being decapitated or hacked to death by machete. An effort to incorporate ex-rebels into the Congolese army has also backfired. Many former rebels don Congolese military fatigues but continue to operate as separate militias, preserving their former allegiances and chains of command. Moreover, these groups have been accused of committing a large number of the atrocities linked to the Congolese military.

With a chorus of condemnation over UN complicity in human rights violations emanating from watch groups, a recent New York Times article revealed that the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs warned of such an outcome. In April, the office informed the UN peacekeeping department that its participation along side the Congolese army risked violating international humanitarian law. However, faced with a no-win situations, UN officials chose to pursue the least-worst option, knowing that a pullout would have facilitated reprisals upon villages by returning rebels. Nevertheless, the UN has failed to resolve the inherent contradiction in a mission charged with protecting civilians while backing a military campaign widely accused of committing atrocities.

In the coming weeks, the UN Security Council must reassess it objectives in eastern Congo. Donald Steinberg of the International Crisis Group points out that the last UN Security Council mandate included 41 priorities, which essentially meant there were no priorities. Moreover, it must reconsider its relationship with the Congolese army and reevaluate its offensive operations. One option is to forgo its direct operational involvement and focus on protecting areas where the rebels have been driven out. However, such a mission would do nothing to address the ongoing abuses committed by all groups involved. On the other hand, if the Security Council decides to continue supporting the Congolese army, it must demand more MONUC involvement in the planning and implementation of operations in addition to demands that internal perpetrators of abuse are brought to justice. Whichever course it chooses, the UN Security Council is facing a monumental decision. Despite the failings of the UN mission in the DRC, it is difficult to imagine a peaceful resolution to this intractable conflict without the participation of the international community.

Public Opinion. It Matters?

It seems as though every day brings new polls, new logs of public opinion. Really though, how much does it really influence the government, the presidential administration? It would seem as though many instances occur that can be interpreted as an administration acting as they see fit regardless of public opinion and then swaying the public to their side as an afterthought. So the thought actually is that yes public opinion matters but is not necessarily the preceding deciding factor in implementation and action.

The troop deployment to Afghanistan for example, would the administration have sent any troops if the public had not seen fit? Sure they floated numbers for months on end trying to gage what the response would be to different scenarios, 34,000 here 40,000 there but really, if the public had strongly desired 0 troops, would that have prevented the government from acting? Would it have been enough for a immediate pull out from Afghanistan? Now that is a dramatization of the events. Clearly to some the war still appeals to the fear of security marked by the terrorist attacks that started it in the first place. So on a milder note, if the US public had been largely only supportive of say 10,000 troops would it have mattered? If the administration had the knowledge that such a minute number couldn't possibly get the job done would they have thought twice about sending what they needed? I think not.

Now this theory changes as say election year approaches, then the matter of public opinion is front and center, nothing the people don't want in large majority rarely sees any action. So maybe public opinion is contingent on the calendar. Then there is the swaying of the public to the cause after a decision has been made, great propaganda. Does the government really present the truth? Sure they do, candy coated with a big bow, unless they would like a more emotional response then you'll see the battle field tragedies and soldiers, the horrors of human rights violations, you see what they would like you to see, whatever helps the cause.

I know there are so many arguments that the government serves the people, "for the people, by the people" right? This is not denying such. only displaying the fact that many times it is contingent on the desired results. Now arguing such raises the question of whether this is a good characteristic? If the public is strongly against an outcome or decision that the experts say is required, who is better to judge? The public, who for a large part knows a little about everything but not enough about anything, or the experts? Ultimately the public must support what is done or no administration would ever survive, but the point is that complacent public opinion does not need to come before the decisions, it just has to be coerced and conveyed at some point. So, public opinion, does it matter?

Obamanation

The response to Obama’s troop increase in Afghanistan is an interesting look at public opinion and the foreign policy elite. The Economist, foreign policy elitism at its finest, thinks Obama is showing weakness. Others – within Obama’s own crew – think he made the wrong decision. The public, with interest in Afghanistan, is more fearful about China, health care, and flat-out reducing US foreign involvement. Finally – and interestingly – the Neocons are supporting the Obama policy in Afghanistan. I guess I should clarify that. I am not saying it is shocking that the Neocons support the Afghan decision; it is just interesting that Obama would implement a strategy which would also be supported by Neocons.

Afghanistan troop increases make sense for Neocons, whose mantra of hegemony and Manichean motivations make foreign involvement a perpetual responsibility. Most of the American public, however, do not agree with that. This is not to say that Obama is becoming a Neocon – not at all – but it does illustrate that the Neocons are not strictly Republican either. They are independent foreign policy elite who found a home in the Bush administration when answers were needed and strategy implemented. The public seems to lump them with Republicans now – and that is not a fair understanding of the nuances.

The divide between the public and the foreign policy elite is apparent, and the decision in Afghanistan – while not based on a Neocon perspective – is a great example. Other recent divisions: the public fear of China and the elite’s conviction that the threat is almost nonexistent, at least for another generation. The elite are concerned with climate change; the public wants less foreign involvement.

All of this is to say, how well is Obama doing in his attempts to bridge the divide? I think he is doing a pretty good. I happen to agree with many of his decisions, but I also think any honest observer should admit Obama is doing good job of keeping the public informed and not getting major blowback for his decisions. Afghanistan is an example. It was a major decision for Obama to send more troops - more troops than Bush in Iraq. It may have divided his party but there were no major “Vietnam” protests as a result. Whether or not Obama is appearing weak is the wrong question. Weak to who? Clearly, the President has specific foreign policy agendas. Balancing and communicating those to the US public is not an easy task, and I think Obama is doing a good job with his rhetoric.

Combating Al Qaeda at the End of 2009

Recent intelligence estimates the Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan at only about 100 operatives. The same intel suggests that several hundred Al Qaeda dwell just across the border in Pakistan. Our war in Afghanistan appears to be against the Taliban, yet Al Qaeda is largely considered the group more hostile to American interests, and of course was the group America sought to eliminate for conducting the 9/11 attacks. We have declared war in Afghanistan and President Obama has recently announced an expanded military presence in that country. Yet, all signs point to Pakistan being the country that is home to our primary enemy.

In a recent contribution to the New York Times, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari expresses the sentiment his government and the Pakistani public share against having foreign troops enter to combat extremists. Entering Pakistan with traditional military forces has not been an option and seemingly will never become one. President Obama is in the precarious position of needing quick success in the region without violating this Pakistani demand to respect their sovereignty. Obama and his key aides, including National Security Advisor General James L. Jones, have met with Pakistani leaders in recent weeks to demand that progress be made, implying that if it is not, the U.S. will be forced to take care of Al Qaeda in Pakistan on its own.

What then will be done to combat Al Qaeda in Pakistan at the present time? The U.S. will continue the CIA Predator drone program in Pakistan, which it does not officially acknowledge for fear of greater backlash from the Pakistani citizenry. President Obama has been even more supportive of this program than President Bush was in terms of amount of strikes authorized. Indeed, Obama is said to have authorized a strike last August that killed Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, along with several family members and body guards. The next step with the program would be to expand it from the semi-autonomous tribal areas along Afghanistan’s eastern border to the more populated and governed Pakistani region of Balochistan below Afghanistan’s southern border.

The Predator drone program is controversial because it is unacknowledged, because the Pakistani press has reported several hundred civilian casualties have resulted (likely exaggerated), and because it is seen as a counterterrorism tactic rather than a counterinsurgency tactic and therefore could create more militants and resentment as quickly as targets are eliminated. Whether or not this last point is true remains hotly contested and perhaps cannot be answered with any degree of precision. Other sources of controversy surrounding the program include the extent to which Blackwater/Xe operatives have been actively involved in the program and how much the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) supports U.S. efforts by proposing targets, offering bases for drone take-offs, etc.

Obama and the American public seem to appreciate the ability of the drones to combat key extremists while keeping U.S. forces out of harm’s way. When news breaks that a key insurgent leader has been killed by such a strike, there is cause to be thrilled, as such a successes are few and far between. In fact, just days ago, a high-ranking Al Qaeda figure was said to be killed by a drone aircraft in South Waziristan in northwest Pakistan. If true, “it would be the first time coalition forces had killed a top Al Qaeda figure in almost a year.” It seems, then, that this program will be continued into the near future. All the while, the CIA and White House spokesmen, along with Pakistani government officials, will continue to publically state the hard line position that such drone attacks do not occur and will not be supported.

The Threat of Homegrown Terrorism

For years Americans have assumed that they are not as vulnerable to “homegrown” terrorists as Europe is. The 9/11 hijackers prepared inside the U.S., but they were not U.S. citizens. Of course John Walker Lindh achieved notoriety for fighting with the Taliban against the U.S. military, but he was not implicated in any terrorist plot against the U.S. homeland. In contrast, Richard Reid, the “Shoe Bomber,” was a British citizen. The perpetrators of the London bombings in 2005 were also homegrown terrorists.

Americans must rethink the perceived lack of homegrown terrorists in the U.S., however. In the last few months there have been numerous plots that should change perceptions for good. In September, the American Michael Finton was arrested by the FBI for trying to blow up a federal building in Springfield Illinois. Also in September, another terrorist plot was uncovered to bomb buildings in New York. Although the plotter, Najibullah Zazi, was not a U.S. citizen, he has lived in the U.S. for the last ten years. In November, U.S. citizen Nidal Malik Hasan gunned down 13 people and injured 32 others at Fort Hood. On December 7, the Justice Department filed charges against David Headley for helping to plot last year’s Mumbai terrorist attacks. Headley is a U.S. citizen who is also charged with plotting terrorist attacks against the Danish newspaper that published controversial cartoons depicting Mohammed. The Mumbai attacks killed six Americans and Headley is charged with aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens.

Just today Pakistani police arrested five American men who went missing from the Washington D.C. area last month. A farewell video left by one of them stated that Muslims must be defended and showed images of U.S. casualties. Family members tipped authorities off that the young men may have gone to Pakistan. It is as yet unknown whether they were there for “business or pleasure,” but it will be interesting to see how the situation unfolds over the next few days. In any case, there have been a number of homegrown terror plots in the last few months. Americans need to take the threat of homegrown terrorism seriously. Muslim Americans need to be better integrated into American society and not alienated. Addressing homegrown terrorism is yet another critical issue that the Obama administration needs to address in the coming months.

Interests in Terms of Power

In this week’s Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria wrote the cover article titled “The Post-Imperial Presidency.” Zakaria details Obama’s realist world view in several key aspects. A few quotes:

• “More than any president since Richard Nixon, he has focused on defining American interests carefully, providing the resources to achieve them, and keeping his eyes on the prize.”

• “It is now clear that Obama is attempting something quite ambitious – to reorient American foreign policy toward something less extravagant and adversarial.”

• “The history of great powers suggests that maintaining their position requires, most crucially, tending to the sources of their power: economic growth and technological innovation.”

• “Obama’s realism is sure to be caricatured as bloodless and indifferent to human rights, democracy, and other virtues.”

These assertions indicate Zakaria’s view of a post-imperial realism. But how do they stack up with regard to Hans Morgenthau’s principles of political realism?

Key to Morgenthau’s definition are the assertions that realism is defined in interest in terms of power, the distinction between what is desirable and what is possible under concrete circumstances of time and place, and the emphasis on rational foreign policy that minimizes risks and maximizes benefits.

While Zakaria’s characterization of the Obama administration’s foreign policy focuses on the practical aspect of political realism, his assertions hold with Morgenthau’s definition.

Obama seeks to avoid imperial overstretch that has weakened previous hegemons. He wants to limit U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, while still pushing for victory there. His emphasis on stability, peace and prosperity over human rights and democracy promotion reveal a role for the United States that maximizes the effective use of its power while limiting its risks.

Obama’s assertion that the nation he is most interested in building is the United States shows his focus on building America’s traditional source of power: the economic base. America’s economic strength and technological superiority was the backbone of its success in World War II and the Cold War. By building the domestic strength of the United States while limiting its international exposure, Obama is acknowledging the negative effects of interventionism on America’s power.

As Zakaria notes, the real test of Obama’s realist foreign policy will be in 18 months when he is forced to make a decision in Afghanistan. If instability and weakness persist, will Obama insist on removing the training wheels and pulling out American forces to focus on the buildup of U.S. domestic power, or will he commit the United States to a nation-building exercise that saps America’s resources and limits its ability to project power elsewhere?

American Public vs FP Elite

As we saw in class and in the readings for this week, American public opinion with respect to foreign policy (and national security) often diverges with that of the foreign policy elite - whether it be the policymakers within the beltway, political pundits or bloggers, or those in academia. The Pew survey on foreign policy attitudes, released last week, confirms this divergence: troop levels in Afghanistan, protectionism levels, national security priorities, and even acceptable torture. As a proxy for the "foreign policy elite," the Pew surveyed 642 members of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) while questioning 2000 people of the general public.

As the results show, the major findings reported by Pew are increased isolationism, unilateralism and a sense that China is becoming more powerful, with a clear plurality of 4% (compared to 30% in 2005) seeing China as having the most powerful economy in the world despite pretty clear evidence to the contrary. In general, we can assume the views from these types of surveys taken by the foreign policy elites (which may or may not agree with the predominate views of the American public) will be the ones that influence foreign policy decisions. For instance, 50% of the CFR survey respondents thought troop levels should increase (the questions were asked prior to Obama's speech last week) while a plurality of 40% of the general public said the number of troops should be decreased. Other stark differences in this report may portend future policy decisions against the grain of American opinion. A central question to this trend is, is it likely to continue?

Probably so. As Dan Drezner states, the poll data shows that the American public is pretty realist and pretty dumb/uninformed. Certainly not a surprise to Drezner, who cites his own piece on realists traditions in America, these results reveal undermining values and interests that define the American experience. The U.S. will have to suffer through much greater recessions, wars, and debts for its average citizen to give at least two hoots about foreign affairs. Further, as the James Fallows article on the media showed, the content of today's "mainstream" media outlets, especially on foreign policy, tends to be vacuous and focus more on politics rather than the true matter at hand. Pundits can exacerbate mistrust for politicians especially when lecturing a relatively-uninformed audience.

Another interesting query about public opinion is which political party is more informed (and optimistic) on foreign policy given a certain party's presidency? For instance, is the average American Republican so turned off by Obama and tuned into a Glen Beck-type FP mediator (who can offer more entertainment and criticism than fact) that he/she is less knowledgeable (the same being true for average Democrats under President Bush or any other Republican president and/or Congress)? While certain groups may be less informed than others no matter what, I would posit that this trend would be hard to prove statistically but could be true (I didn't come across any study having done so). Either way, while these polls certainly offer an interesting insight into the opinions of Americans (assuming the polls are accurate to the degree they claim), public opinion alone - without a strong spokesman, interest group, etc. - will likely continue not to significantly influence foreign policy.