Will there be a Vietnamization of Afghanistan?

America's longest war keeps getting longer, and despite the goal of a 2014 drawdown in Afghanistan, its end is not in sight. The signs of a possible Vietnamization of Afghanistan, or at least of a replication of the Soviet Afghan experience, seem to be increasing.

The US had already set the goal for ending "combat operations" in Afghanistan by 2014 (the same semantic bait-and-switch that allows for 50,000 US troops to remain in Iraq, often still very much involved in combat) ahead of last week's NATO summit in Lisbon. The NATO consensus was similar, calling for a transfer of security responsibilities to Afghanistan in 2014, while NATO forces will remain in an advising and monitoring capacity.

That is all well and good, but does not actually suggest when the American public can expect the return of US troops and an end to the violence of our nine year war in this barren corner of the world. And in order to make a 2014 drawdown realistic, things may get worse before they get better. Mark Sedwill, NATO's top civilian representative in Kabul reminds us that "2014 is a goal and not a guarantee) and that events could conspire to push that date back. Furthermore, the war in Afghanistan could involve "eye-watering levels of violence by Western standards."

What that might entail is not clear, but the intent of the statement is. With Americans far more indirectly related to the goings on of the military--even with the modern media--than they were in the era of Vietnam conscription, the violent measures dictated by the situation on the ground are unlikely to receive the analysis of public discourse they are due. This is especially true as Americans become ever more war weary and the conflict in Afghanistan becomes more unpopular with time. The present state of affairs, where Americans are complacent with the fact that their country is involved in two, long-term, ongoing wars in distant countries is unprecedented in American history. That the state of the economy has completely overshadowed foreign policy concerns in a wartime country such that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in no way meaningfully factored into the recent Midterm elections would likely shock and possibly repulse previous generations of Americans.

It seems that complacency is likely to continue even as the level of violence in Afghanistan trends upwards, validating Mr. Sedwill's warning. For one, the air war--all but suspended by McChrystal due to its capacity for alienating local populations--has come back with a vengeance in Petraeus's Afghanistan. October was the most active month in the skies of Afghanistan for missile and drone attacks since the beginning of the war, with over 1,000 strikes. This air war and its undeclared extension into Pakistan (analogous to the secrecy of Operation Menu, though the massive air war in Cambodia remained obscured in the days before the 24-hour news cycle) has already created adverse side effects. Sixty-nine of the 223 civilian deaths attributed to coalition forces this year have been from air attacks, and the first six months of 2010 were the deadliest yet for Afghan civilians, up 31% (though most civilian deaths have been due to suicide attacks and IEDs; though sectarian violence may be a response to more intense coalition measures).

This rise in violence occurs as the posturing of American forces comes to resemble some of the measures that were denounced during Vietnam and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Due to the sheer number of booby-trapped homes in Kandahar, NATO forces have taken to demolishing neighborhoods wholesale, compensating inhabitants whether or not they were interested in being relocated. The use of 16 M1 Abrams tanks in Helmand for "awe and shock" as much as for their military utility will be uncomfortably similar to lumbering Soviet armor to former mujahideen. As though these similarities weren't enough, the sheer amount of manpower--100,000 US personnel, roughly 130,000 in terms of all NATO forces--certainly echo the manpower used by the Soviets during their occupation. In fact, Defense Secretary Gates cautioned that we should avoid such similarities just a year ago:

"The Soviets were in there with 110,000, 120,000 troops. They didn’t care about civilian casualties. And they couldn’t win. If there’s ever an example that military power alone cannot be successful in Afghanistan, I think it was the Soviet experience. And I think there’s a lot we can learn from that."

So now the US-led war in Afghanistan has gone on longer than Vietnam with no end in sight; is starting to see the use of some of the same tactics in that war; and in size, scope, and the use of armor is beginning to resemble the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan--the results of which (and the unintended consequences of our support of the mujahideen) we are still cleaning up. One might have hoped that the NATO Lisbon summit on Afghanistan would provide answers about how the war will be drawn to a close, but it left only greater uncertainty and warnings that the violence could continue to escalate. The war in Afghanistan, once overshadowed by that in Iraq, is threatening to roar back with a vengeance (though it truly never left). Will a complacent American populace notice? And if they do, what political action will they take to affect the course of history? The answers to these questions hold significant implications for the futures of both the US and Afghanistan.

How We (Shouldn't) Spend Our Money

A couple of news stories this week should make everyone question how the United States doles out aid to military partners.

First, a series of audits revealed that the US can't account for literally millions of dollars it throws down that bottomless pit in Afghanistan. In order to avoid the corrupt Afghani officials that we fear would merely pocket employees' salaries, the US often makes many of the payments itself. But somehow, we haven't kept track of it. Danger Room goes into greater analysis of the matter.

Essentially, while the US was paying Afghanis through myriad agencies, there was never any central bookkeeping or other accountability measures. Thus, millions of dollars in disbursements are now unaccounted for and were likely gobbled up by corrupt officials. The focus of the audits were on the period from 2005-2008, but it appears the issue has continued this year. For some idea of what is at stake, the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance's estimates of US payouts to Afghani 6,600 is about $45 million, and this is widely seen as lowballing it.

The failure of the government to keep track of its money is extremely worrisome. First it demonstrates an obvious bureaucratic failure. At the same time, it suggests we don't really know what our goals are in Afghanistan nor how to arrive at them. We have so little faith in the Karzai government due to endemic corruption that we then attempt--and fail--to circumvent it entirely. At best this must come off as hypocritical to Afghanis and at worst, our own cash is creating the corruption problem. We cannot point an accusatory finger at Iran for giving Afghani officials cash when it is a common, and failed, policy of our own.

The second event demonstrating our inability to be resolute with our money came as the Administration tried to quietly grant waivers to four countries named in the 2008 Child Soldiers Prevention Act. The goal of the legislation is to cut off support of regimes that make use of child soldiers. The four countries--Chad, Yemen, Sudan, and the DR Congo--are seen by the Administration as vital to US security interests; primarily in the War on Terror. As such, a year's reprieve has been given for these states to achieve compliance with the law. Of the four, only Chad has taken clear steps towards demobilization of child soldiers.

The Administration's backpedaling on the matter is disheartening. Foreign Policy got in on a conference call in which the White House tried to patch things up with peeved Members of Congress and NGO representatives. The explanation was rather weak: the countries didn't have enough time, it's a new Administration, and they should be given another year. Never mind that the bill was passed under George W. Bush and there have already been a full two years for the countries to demobilize. It is not as though the terms of the legislation were at all vague or that the countries didn't know the threatened loss of aid was coming. The event represents that the US, or at least the White House, is willing to sell out its liberal international agenda in order to pursue a realist purpose of threat reduction, even if it means permitting the continuation of the evil of child soldiers. What hope is there that this position will actually change next year?

I am concerned by the fact that these stories weren't very well-represented by the media going into the weekend. By the time of the child soldiers conference call on Friday, the thwarted terrorist attacks mentioned in the previous post had already occurred, so any meaningful discussion of these issues were effectively tabled. I understand the concern of most Americans at the moment is the economy first and foremost, but the inability of our government to responsibly use its money in pursuing foreign policy goals--whether through bad bookkeeping or filling the coffers of those committing crimes such as the utilization of child soldiers--is likely just the tip of the iceberg in terms of government corruption and incompetence. Events such as these should have a real effect on any intelligent discussion of the defense budget or the deficit. Whether in terms of national security issues or any other matter of government fiscal responsibility, our policymakers need to take a good, long look at how the government spends' taxpayers money as we, or perhaps before we should, consider serious austerity measures or tax cuts. I think it is probably not surprising to anyone that this sort of responsible discussion does not appear to be happening in Washington.

RESTREPO

If we let people see that kind of thing, there would never again be any war. -Pentagon official explaining why the U.S. military censored footage from the Gulf War

In 2007, seasoned war reporters Tim Hetherington and Sebastian Junger embedded with Second Platoon, Battle Company, 173rd Airborne during their deployment to the Korengal Valley, Afghanistan, which at the time was the deadliest place on earth for American soldiers. They documented Second Platoon's experience and were published in a sobering and excellent January 2008 Vanity Fair article which (in complete seriousness) should be required reading for all citizens of the United States.

During their time with Second Platoon, they also kept a video camera rolling and this past summer released a documentary titled RESTREPO, after the outpost Second Platoon built and defended during the length of their deployment. The film, which has been showing at the Kentucky Theater all week and will be released on DVD and Blue Ray on November 30, has been met with rave reviews and won the Sundance Film Festival's Best Documentary award this year. Here's a good Huffington Post article written in this past June about the film.

What's that? You don't think you'll watch the film? Why should you see this film, you ask? Because you are an American, that's why. You say this sort of stuff doesn't interest you? Good one. I can think of no better way to insult our soldiers than to say that. It's too graphic, too sad, war stuff bothers me. Please let me run and get you a tissue. Bothers you? The soldiers of Second Platoon lived 15 months what you'll see for a brief 90-minutes. Their friends were shot and killed as they watched on. They, now, today, as I write this, take sleeping pills, anti-depressants, have nightmares, feel injuries, run pictures through their minds... their experiences at OP RESTREPO will never leave them. And they did what they did, and what they continue to do, defending you. That's right, you.

You may think RESTREPO is just a film, but it's not. It's way more than a film or a movie. It is 90 minutes of reality for thousands of US soldiers who have fought and died since 2001 to protect our nation and our people. RESTREPO lives every moment in the minds of those who have seen combat and lost dear friends. It should stir emotions in you, it should hurt you... it is their reality, each and every day.

What does all this have to do with our National Security Policy class? It's simple. The disconnect between our public and our military is vast and tears at the very fabric of our country's foundation. Nothing could be more dangerous to our national security than to have an uninformed public who elects leadership that does not understand the costs and consequences of war. RESTREPO seeks to start to bridge that gap. The film is not political. You'll notice not one politician or diplomat is interviewed during the film, only the soldiers directly related to Second Platoon. RESTREPO is the soldier's experience alone, and thus, a window for the public to see the direct, real results of our country's policy actions, carried out everyday. Agree with the war or not, this film shows reality and leaves you to decide the rest.

Ernest Hemingway reminds us to "never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime."

If you read this post and do not subsequently take action to increase your understanding of what our soldiers go through in Afghanistan, then my friend, you are part of the problem. Plain and simple. The greatest threat to our national security is the ignorance and apathy of our people. Go see RESTREPO.