How much of strategic thought can we shape and controlled?
How much of our strategic thought is secondary to what is thrust upon us?
Is the ratio of our ability to shape and control to what is thrust upon us, (i.e. more reactive) shifting?
It would be comforting to
believe, and preferable, that the origins of a nation’s strategic thought and policy
manifestations are predominantly driven by our own desires and a projection of the
world we choose to live in and fully shape as nations. The reality weighs heavier on the idea
that national strategic thought originates from being confronted with forces
beyond our full control and reflects, more often, a reactive development,
particularly in the near term, i.e. a nation playing the hand dealt, rather than the one we desire or planned to have. National strategic thought must originate in simultaneously in efforts to deal with the immediate circumstances, while continuing to work towards shaping the future in a way that reshuffles the deck in our favor.
How did America go from
avoiding entanglements and wariness of significant peacetime standing armies to
inextricably entangle and a permanent preeminent military? It is definitely not how things would have evolved if we had full control of the changing dynamics, and therefore could rely on current strategy to dictate the future. The origins of strategic thought that dictated a polar shift in the US, from that of avoiding entanglements and wariness of standing armies to an America inextricably entangle and with a permanent preeminent military strategy, was inevitable and driven near fully extrinsically and generally beyond our power to control.
President George
Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address, Kennan’s “long telegraph”, and President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farwell Address each demonstrate the origins of American
Strategy dictated by changing relative US strengths, vulnerabilities, and comparative
advantages at that moment, pitted against the global dynamics and dangers forced upon us.
Benjamin Franklin suggested, “Vessels large may
venture more, but little boats should keep near shore.”(1) While Mr. Franklin
sought to advise would-be entrepreneurs on risk in business, the same can be
said for fledgling young relatively weak nations such as the United States of
the late 18th and early 19th century,
particularly if that nation could safely seek relative isolation.
Our
first US President under our new Federal Constitution foresaw the potential for
the United States to grow in prosperity and strength and take its place among
the great powers of the world: “the period is not far off when we may
defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude
as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we
may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.”(2)
But that day had not yet arrived. The United States was only seven and a half years
into the new Federal era (post Articles of Confederation) with its new republic formed under the US Constitution effectively born with the first
session of the new US Congress on March 4, 1789. While the United States' finances improved in the 1790’s, and the diplomatically awkward debt incurred
to France during the revolution had been assumed by an American banker (at a
slightly higher interest rate, and the debt then resold on the domestic US
markets for a profit) (1), federal revenue continued to fall short of
expenditures many years of the 1790’s. Furthermore, the United States
essentially had no Army, having disbanded the Continental
Army June 2nd 1784
in general consensus with Continental Congress Delegate, Elbridge Gerry’s
belief that “standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the
principles of republican governments dangerous to the liberties of a free
people,” (3)
America’s comparative
strength lay in the breadth of the Atlantic and in avoiding compromising
influences from the great powers of the day. “Our detached and distant
situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course”(2), rather
than become entangled in alliances that, given America’s relative weakness,
would entrap and make our young nation dependent. President Washington
warned, “As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such
attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent
patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic
factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to
influence or awe the public councils. Such an attachment of a small or weak
towards a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the
latter.” (2)
Washington’s cautions and
advise in his farewell address were consistent with his Presidential
Proclamation of Neutrality three years prior, issued 22 April 1793, “Whereas
it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great
Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other;
and the duty and interest of the United States require, that they should with
sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial
toward the belligerent Powers” …….“And I do hereby also make known, that
whatsoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to
punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or
abetting hostilities against any of the said Powers, or by carrying to any of
them those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations,
will not receive the protection of the United States, against such punishment
or forfeiture” (4)
For America near the
beginning of the 1800’s, our relative weakness and continued vulnerability to
the whims of the great powers of Europe was the origins of pragmatic and risk
adverse American strategic thought appropriate for the time – neutrality to the
extent possible, while our “detached and distant situation” allowed us to
continue building our national unity, Institutions, commerce, industry and
agriculture. Successfully employed, this strategy altered US relative position and vulnerabilities. The adopted current strategy not only responded to the realities thrust upon us at that instant, but appropriately provided a medium to long-term path to secure future advantages for the US through deepening national cohesion and unity, stronger and more mature civil institutions, expanded commerce and industry, and steady economic growth that would expand legitimate US strategic courses in the future - i.e. would over time shift US position from one in which our options were narrow and more dictated, to one in which growing strength and advantage would facilitate our ability to have greater influence in shaping the world and developing broader strategic options in pursuit of furthering US national interests.
American strategic thought
continued to gravitate generally towards the comfort of non-entanglement
afforded by the relative security of distance from major world powers and
potential foreign belligerents through the 19th Century, and
again after WWI. Following the First World War, America again withdrew. Our
natural inclination, particularly following the witnessed horror that was the
Great War in Europe, undermined President Woodrow Wilson’s quest see America
help to establish a new and enduring peace via the League of Nations and his
“fourteen points”. While aspects of his endeavor moved forward, it was primary influence the United States, without the nation that had emerged as the world’s
strongest economic power.
The pattern of War and
then draw down forces, and dismantling the industries of war necessarily ended
after World War II. The world had changed forever. The origins of what became
US post war strategic thought and policy were thrust upon us; not of our direct
making or desire. Naval capabilities and rapid reach, the growing range of
strategic aircraft, and rapidly evolving missile technology had effectively
made the world much smaller. The great oceans no longer afforded us the unique
luxury of isolation or protracted time to assess and respond to growing
threats. The lessons of WWII had taught us that the United States had
continuous, direct and more immediate strategic interest in once distant world
events. The immediate post war environment presented and immediate challenge
and a reasonably perceived threat secondary to a Soviet Union capacity to
dominate a war torn Europe and Asia - save for US influence, strength and
deterrence.
“We have learned that we
cannot live alone, at peace; that our own well-being is dependent on the
well-being of other nations far away”. Franklin Delano
Roosevelt (5)
This necessary great
departure from America’s predilection towards withdraw, the realization that
the United States “cannot live alone, at peace” led US participation and a permanent member on the US Security Council (established 9 months later)– vs –
America’s rejection of the League of Nations and greater abstinence from
international leadership and engagement following the first world war. The United States ushered in a new economic and international finance regime with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Word Bank, the US Dollar as the world currency benchmark, and through evolving mechanisms to move the world towards expanded trade and shared prosperity with the Global Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) agreements over time.
The new and radically
different world post WWII led to the Truman Doctrine, first introduced in it’s
nascent form in President Truman’s address before a joint session of
congress March 12, 1947 in which he declared “I believe it must be
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe
that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own
way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial
aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes” (6) Leading
then to the Marshall plan in 1948 (7)
And if there was any lingering thought that the United States still existed as an island and that once again withdrawing from the world was still an option, the USSR’s first nuclear detonation Aug 1949, first USSR's first thermonuclear detonation Aug 1953, and the launching of Sputnik 1 in October and then Sputnik 2 in November 1957, with implicit Soviet ICBM capability, ended such misconceptions.
At the center of this new
post WWII direction in US strategic thinking– and a source of original
strategic thought within the confines of the new world thrust upon us - was
American Diplomat George Kennan. Kennan helped form US understanding of
the Soviet Union and shape what became known as “containment policy” aimed at
the Soviet Union and what was then believed to be one communist hegemon under
the USSR’s control. Kennan outlined the Soviet threat first in what become
known as “the long telegram” (8) sent from Moscow, 22 February 1946, and later
in the “Mr. X” attributed The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign
Affairs Magazine, July 1947.
And finally, I will
discuss the realities thrust upon America that served as the origins of the obligatory new strategic thought and radical new strategy for the United States - a strategy of perpetually US military
readiness, a permanent war footing, and an American commitment to permanent international engagement and to defending and stabilizing the post WWII world - as presented in President Dwight D Eisenhower’s Farwell address, 17 January
1961. A speech in which America was informed in no uncertain terms that United States was now engaged in a protracted struggle for which there may be no end. The cold
war became a potentially permanent state in which the world would exist, with
no clear path out.
For those American’s who
have any knowledge of President Eisenhower’s parting words, most are probably
familiar only with some vague version of “we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military-industrial complex”. (9)
President Eisenhower did
urge his fellow Americans to guard against distortions in our economy, society
and democracy, which could arise within this dramatic departure form America’s
past norm of interwar demilitarization. But this guidance must be considered
within the further context of the entire near 16 minute and greater than two
thousand words speech in which he stated the absolute necessity, commensurate
with the current threat facing the United States and the world, of this new
perpetual military construct.
“Until the latest of our
world conflicts, the United States has had no armaments industry. American
makers of plowshares could, in time and as required, make swords as well. But
now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have
been compelled to create permanent armaments industry of vast proportions”(9)
“A vital element in
keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready
for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his
own destruction.” (9)
“We face a hostile
ideology global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and
insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite
duration” (9)
While recognizing
the “immense military establishment” to be “new in the
American experience”, President Eisenhower goes on to say “We
recognize the imperative need for this development.” (9)The Origins of
American strategic thought, and implementation of a strategy previously unknown
and unimagined in America, were not fully of our design or choosing, but rather
thrust upon the United States and the world.
Just as the end of the
first World War and WWII failed to bring the long sought peace and a world
without war, the end of the Cold War certainly did not bring the anticipated
“peace dividend”. Any elation in our status as the heavy weight champion
of the world and last standing superpower was fleeting. Once again a
chapter in conflict closed has only brought new uncertainty, upheaval and
radically changing security dynamics that have produced new vulnerabilities and
burdens most Americans had not imagined. Endless seemingly imminent threats,
not only from some of the usual suspects (North Korea, Iran, a newly bellicose
Russia, and other traditional state actors), but from shape shifting and
borderless non-state actors with apocalyptic visions and with no distinction
between legitimate military targets verses innocent civilian. Any American and
western culture interest anywhere in the world is a potential target. Within the battle against extremism, jihad, and/or nihilistic enemies willing and possibly eager to die in service of their cause, force structures and strategies of the past are no longer optimal. Our retaliatory capability has no deterrent power. Our nuclear arsenal has no
influence on their plans – Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) sounds like a good day to
them, embraced as an opportunity to hasten fulfillment of an imagined gloriously ordained apocalyptic destiny. And while we may easily topple any regime, and pummel almost any
military in the world (and must maintain this capacity in response to more conventional threats), this enemy has seemingly single-minded determination and exhibits no apparent “acceptable loss” threshold that we can exploit. Indeed, a perverse and intractable foe like none America and the greater world has
ever faced. The origins to new strategic thought seek to frame a coherent and sustainable strategy to once again prevail in a conflict with no predictable end.
The origins of strategic thoughts are the circumstances of any dramatic shift that renders previous strategic thought no longer satisfactory or fully capable of responding to current realities, or secondary to emerging options secondary to new advantages and technological capabilities. The origin of strategic thought is forced upon a nation as much as, or more so, than formulated from within based on our desires or strategic thinkers at the moment. As necessity is the mother of invention, emergence of new threats, spectacular unforeseen events, or a paradigm shift secondary to new capacities and capabilities is the origin of strategic thought. Strategy is a scheme of maneuver with boundaries dictated first and foremost by a nation’s current realities, its relative strengths, weakness, comparative advantages measured against the strengths, weaknesses and comparative advantage of belligerent or contrarily aligned nations and non-state actors who's perceived self interest is detrimental to ours. Ideally strategic thought, available courses of action, and policy are formed under the parameters of an objective and rigorous net-assessment analysis process - one that not only seeks to define our's and the enemy's freedom of maneuvers and available courses action, with the aim of recommending a means to increase our advantages and exploit our enemy's weaknesses over the course of time; but also (when our adversary is perceived to be a rational actors) seeks to suss out the adversary's perception of relative strengths weaknesses, and what they believe to be our most likely courses of action, and why? But such rigorous and comprehensive process is either not pursued, suffers in soundness secondary to too few available objective knowns and to many uncertain assumptions, or is ultimately ignored by the key decision makers and attacked by parochial interests and the status quo.
America possesses great strategic advantages secondary to our current overall military dominance and several areas of world leading defense technology superiority - currently without peer in critical areas, and as the worlds largest economy with the capacity to maintain our many advantages and create others. America also has inherent limitations in the the scope and sustainability of strategic options available relative to the menu that might be created within a vacuum of an insulated and pure arena of strategic thought unaccountable to American and global opinion. As a a nation conscious of global perceptions and with a desire to maintain a moral authority to lead, influence, and shape international institutions, global rules, and norms of international conduct; our strategy in response to any one challenge, and the available courses of action in pursuit of our perceived national interests, is necessarily constrained, relatively to our adversaries. Likewise, as a representative democracy with core values deemed inviolable pillars of a moral and unifying American identity, our strategic courses of action are again appropriately constrained relative to enemies less accountable and therefore less dependent on sustaining requisite internal public support.
If in relative stability, (i.e. a less reactive approach unencumbered and not locked in and overwhelmed by immediate responding to curtail others actors active pursuit of their perceived national or ideological interests adverse to us), if given relative freedom of maneuver to implement strategy consistent with well defined long-term national interests, and formed by a nation’s ability to leverage comparative advantages and invest in creating further advantage over the long run and guided with reasonably accurate predictions of future realities, then strategic thought emanating from within can decisively shape long-term strategy and more readily shape more predictable outcomes over an extended period. And when possible, assuming the nation fully exploits the window of opportunity (i.e. we have appropriate leadership, agree upon objectives, and enjoy enlightened strategic vision and foresight that can prevent a loss of focus or lapse into aimless complacency) then we can more fully master and shape broader strategic choices consistent with a future more compliant with our national objectives, ideally creating a growing and sustainable national strategic advantage that builds successively on existing strengths. This is the ideal situation, but one more challenging to achieve absent a more narrow unifying and focused existential threat such as that inherent during the combined half century of WWII and the Cold War, or with rapid changing threats, and further complicated by our current politically factious and severely polarized national angst. The threats driving national strategic thought are now less focused in our multipolar world with regional sub-spheres of influence, power no longer defined by two superpowers, and with increasing freedom of maneuver and lethality of non-state entities. We now face national security challenges not only from the more conventional challenges of emerging nation state conflict, a strained international order and shifting balances of power and influence, but now steadily from non-state actors with increasing reach, lethality, and sophisticated methods for sustained asymmetric conflict. This reality is further complicated by a more interconnected and vulnerable world, - (1) physically connected secondary to ease and speed of travel, (2) economically connected and interdependent by the new globalization of "the second unbundling" (Richard Baldwin defines in the Great Convergence - Information Technology and the New Globalization) with multi-national and multi regional global value chains, and (3) through cyber connectivity as a portal for intrusion into the "internet of things and systems" with inherent vulnerable to infrastructure, proprietary technology, security systems and methods, defense systems of systems, and as a platform for radicalization, coordination, and terrorism calls to action. Many of these same factors may be forming the foundations of a generally more stable and peaceful future, but the rapid shift and readjustment presents instability and volatility in the near term.
As has always been the case in war (or our best efforts to prepare for war), the enemy (and now many disparate enemies) gets a vote, and as such will always be a driver and indirect origin of strategic thought. Within the current threat environment - with hostile entities not easily identified and as irrational actors by conventional standards - our ability for long term strategic thought and policy implementation is much inhibited. As such, a much less predictable and more reactive strategic thought on-the-fly with incomplete information and fewer valid predictive models is thrust upon us. Current reality implies that strategic thought will often lag behind, evolving necessarily after an adversary (previously known or newly emerged) has already sidestepped our current strategy. Therefore, to answer the opening questions, the ratio of our ability to shape and control vs. what is thrust upon us (i.e. more reactive) is shifted relative to that of the later half of the twentieth century. Our increasing challenge, and therefore the focus of strategic thought, is to predict and define dynamic changing or previously unknown threats, and to adapt our strategic thought for national level emerging contingencies and/or disseminate and implement new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the operational level within susceptible operational theaters or sectors as rapidly as possible in order to eliminate or at least mitigate newly identified vulnerabilities. When successful, we shape the threat environment into one more focused and predictable, one more amenable to long-term strategic thought and policy coordination, and one in which we take the initiative and successfully shift the strategic choices more favorably toward US desire to shape and control, and away from that which is thrust upon us and leads to more reactive short term strategy. But for now, we are in the realm of reactive and rapidly shifting strategic thought.
We wish to believe that
we are always generally in control and that well reasoned strategic thought will drive policy
with long-term efficacy, and that it should stretch out before us like a road
into a more or less predictable future. We desire a world in which strategic
thought is widely dictated by our motives and desires, guided more or less by
past challenges and is framed by our vision of how the world should or will be.
It seems clear that the world presents constantly evolving new marginally
predicted realities that simply do not care that our predicted course of
events, for which we prepared and invested so heavily to mitigate and possibly
dominate, has shifted or evaporated as easily as our current terrorist foe
manages to do. Growing unpredictability threatens to dictate US strategy within
the narrow limits of our current strengths, weaknesses and comparative
advantages in the near term, and limit our ability to more accurately predict
and effectively prepare for evolving threats. But we must continue trying to
predict and prepare. It is incumbent on US strategists to continue to seek to
bring order and predictability, while planning and shaping the strategic
advantages we hope to secure in the future. But we must know that the future
never completely cooperates. We must always retain the capacity and resiliency
for the potential and currently more prevalent reactive nature of ever changing challenges, no matter how
well we think we are prepared or how sound we believe our strategy to be. Where we are now, is not where we want to be, and will require flexible strategic thought and national security institutions that empowers our ability not only to predict, but to improvise, adapt, and overcome.
No matter where the United States exists along the strategic spectrum - from the preferred optimal position of strength and relative predictability affording the latitude of fully controlling and shaping strategic thought for ourselves as well as forcing potential adversaries' strategic thought to yield to the reality of our advantage -vs.- a position nearer the other end of the spectrum which forces immediate strategic thought dominated by reacting to what is newly thrust upon us - the origins of strategic thought for the medium to long term must be grounded in seeking and exploiting advantage and shaping a future strategic reality in which the United States is either preserving a preferred optimal position or is concentrating on strategies to move the United States back into an optimal position. And to be successful and sustainable, strategic thought must be broad based, multi-disciplined and all-inclusive; must enhance our economic, technological, military, social, educational, and cultural strength and competitiveness at home and abroad, and strengthen international institutions and alliances as force multipliers and sources of greater stability and predictability. Strategic thought must leverage all opportunities to enhance the United State's position relative to all aspects of hard and soft power. In short the origins of strategic thought must be that which emanates from answering the question "how the United States can be prepared to take every opportunity available to appropriately and respectfully stack the deck in favor of the United States", which in turn promotes greater global stability and general prosperity made increasingly possible through coherent strong consistent credible and appropriate US leadership.
(1) Benjamin
Franklin, The Way to Wealth, 1758
(2) President Washington’s
Farewell Address, Sep 19, 1796
(3) Willard
M. Wallace Appeal To Arms A Military History Of The American Revolution,
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1951.
(4) President Washington’s "Proclamation of Neutrality" 22 April 1793
(5) President Franklin Roosevelt’s 4th Inaugural Address, Jan 20, 1945
(6) McCullough, David Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992
(9) President Dwight D Eisenhower’s Farwell address, 17 January 1961.
(10)(10 Richard Baldwin defines in the Great Convergence - Information Technology and the New Globalization, the Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2016
