North Korea conducted its fifth and
largest nuclear test this month. Outsiders can only guess about the DPRK’s
capabilities.
Yet, with each blast being larger than the next, the program appears
increasingly successful. And while United States and South Korea may be both furious
and anxious, the North will likely face little repercussions for its actions.
Few experts expect China to punish the DPRK.
In a recent New York Times article, Shi
Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing
stated, “The United States cannot rely on China for North Korea. China is
closer to North Korea than the United States.” China is North Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading
partner, and main source of food, arms, and energy. It has helped sustain Kim
Jong-un’s regime, and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on
North Korea in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across
their 870-mile wide border. The United States along with the UN are pushing new
sanctions. However, the numerous
sanctions already in place have yet to deter North Korea, mainly
because of weak Chinese enforcement. North Korea said a push for further sanctions
was “laughable”,
and vowed to continue to strengthen its nuclear power.
This
situation brings us to Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling. “The
power to hurt is a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but used often.”[1] So
opens Schelling’s Arms and Influence,
which discusses the art of coercion in diplomacy. His works are influential in
the field game theory and decision making. Schelling believes that to coerce an
opponent, the coercer needs to make their threats credible and acting
irrationally helps the opponent believe the threats. This craziness helps the
opponent believe the coercer may follow through on a rash decision. Cultivating
irrationality at the highest level of government benefits that state’s
bargaining power.
It
would appear then that North Korean military leaders are well read in
Schelling’s theories. The North’s strategy has been an
almost perfect application of coercion. The DPRK has often provoked its enemies,
upped the ante in the face of international condemnation, and then negotiated
for relief aid or concessions to sanctions. In return, North Korean leaders
promise peace. Incapable of improving economically, the North relies on brinkmanship
alone to make ground. To a casual observer, the DPRK’s actions appear rash.
However, Schelling would recognize this strategy immediately as the art of
commitment, which they have used with a master stroke. As Schelling states, “international relations
often have the character of a competition in risk taking, characterized not so
much by tests of force as by tests of nerve… The perils that countries face
are… more like Russian roulette.”[2] The Kim regime has a knack for self preservation and is ultimately concerned with its own survival. North Korean
leaders would be hesitant to jeopardize their own position but they have convinced
the rest of the world that they could do so to gain an advantage in diplomacy and
negotiations. Seen in this light, the North’s pursuit of nuclear capability is
a defensive ruse.
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| The Deer Hunter 1978 |
So
what is to be done with North Korea? Policymakers could accept the status quo and do nothing. Yet, the status quo of sanctions is largely
ineffectual. Therefore, the US and its allies appear to have two options. The
first option involves Schelling’s brinkmanship. US officials must persuade
North Korea believe the US will not endure further provocations. This option
will be hard to achieve. DPRK officials scoffed at the Air
Forces’ show of force. Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency released a
statement saying, “They are bluffing that B-1Bs are enough for fighting an
all-out nuclear war.” Clearly the Kim regime does not believe that the US would
risk all out war. It appears the US needs to practice better the art of
commitment and start behaving more irrationally. Schelling discusses
“relinquishing the initiative.” This phrase means leaving no options for
retreat or withdraws so that one is forced to respond should the opponent act.
This gives the first move to the opponent and forces the enemy to decide to
initiate the situation past the point of no return. So according to Schelling
then, US leaders’ next move should be rash. The US should mobilize the armed
forces on the highest alert, place the eighth US army on the border, and move
ballistic submarines off the coast of North Korea. They should then make a
significant threat of attack. The conditions of the attack could be the North
detonating another nuclear bomb. Another condition could be blocking UN
inspectors from coming in to North Korea.
However,
setting the stage in this manner is not guaranteed to work and could be
dangerous. North Korean leaders could make the decision that giving up their
nuclear program is not an option. After all, possessing nuclear capabilities is
the key to their defensive strategy and negotiating tactic. North Korean leaders
could simply ignore the US threat as they have done before. Yet, should the Kim
regime believe the US threat of attack, DPRK leaders could make the decision to
go out with a bang. They have actually stated
as much before. The North, then, might attempt a first strike with any nuclear
weapons they currently possess to weaken advancing US forces and inflict
tremendous hurt against South Korean allies. In choosing this option therefore,
if there is even a slight chance that North Korea could launch a nuclear strike,
the US has the imperative to stop it. At this point the US should go full Trump. The most effective means are tactical
nuclear strikes against the DPRK government, their known nuclear facilities, and
ballistic missile sites.
Turning
North Korea into a radioactive wasteland would sure solve the immediate
problem. There may even be a slight chance that Chinese leaders would tacitly accept
such a move. Eliminating the Kim regime in this fashion removes a pesky problem
of dealing with the North’s adventurism while maintaining a large border
between China and US forces. China could gain an upper hand internationally by condemning
such a drastic unilateral US action. To the delight of China, with the North
obliterated, US forces could even leave South Korea. Additionally, China could persuade
a South without the constant threats from the North and without a US military
presence to strengthen relations and economic ties. Obviously, a nuclear attack
against North Korea would have immediate, drastic repercussions for US policymakers.
US standing in the world community would be forever tarnished. Allies could
turn against the US. Tension and the potential for conflict with adversaries,
China in particular, would probably rise to dangerous levels. For these reasons,
while this option may be highly effective, perhaps it is too costly and not the
best option.
As
discussed, DPRK nuclear ambitions are likely a ruse to secure more international
aid so North Korea is not an immediate threat. Thus, the second option is
normalizing relations and removing sanctions all together. US policymakers have
already chosen this track long ago with China and again, more recently, another
cold war adversary. Normalizing
relations with Cuba and China opened isolated regions to US businesses and
influence. China has hundreds of nuclear weapons with far more potential to hurt
the United States and its allies, yet China is one of the United States largest trade
partners. The same strategy could apply to North Korea.
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| https://jerfalerf.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/bambihunter.jpg |
There
are a number of benefits to this option for both sides. Removing sanctions would
allow the North access to sustain itself financially. US businesses would not
only have a new market. Isolation empowers the Kim regime just as it benefited
the Castro government. Normalizing relations would open the avenue for North
Koreans to wear US brands, to listen to US music, and to play US movies in
North Korean theaters. Removing the power of the DPRK government to brainwash
its citizens would be a strong win for US soft power. Not to mention this option
has the added bonus of averting a nuclear war. Perhaps Schelling’s theories are
flawed. Perhaps the situation calls for deterrence over "compellence." Perhaps the world needs less brinkmanship and more reconciliation. After all, Russian roulette is un-American.
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