Playing with a Dangerous Tool: State Militaries in the Hands of African Dictators

Playing with a Dangerous Tool: State Militaries in the Hands of African Dictators

            A recent BBC article reported that the government of Burkina Faso charged General Gilbert Diendere with complicity in the 1987 murder of former President Thomas Sankara.  Diendere himself recently led an ill-fated coup against the present regime in September, yet did not face punishment once the coup ended.  Interestingly enough, Sankara himself assumed control “in an internal power struggle,” otherwise known as a coup.  The present government’s charges are likely a simple political ploy to actually punish Diendere for his recent coup.  Nevertheless, the case of Burkina Faso illustrates broader Sub-Saharan African trends of the consistent breakdown of civil-military relations resulting in coup traps across the continent as military elites continually overthrow the government to seize control of the state. 

Mobile Pick-up Lance Missile Systems; Burkina Faso Army (Wikimedia Commons)

In their book, American Civil-Military Relations, Nielsen and Snider argue that the US (and likely most western countries in general) ought to have politically neutral armed forces that follow objective, rather than subjective control.  This means that the military forces focus on their role of defending the state and achieving its national security interests through violence if necessary, rather than conforming to the societal norms of the populace or politicians it protects.  This ethos failed to develop across Sub-Saharan Africa, as most countries experienced multiple coups over the past half century.  In short, the militaries of these states became a fickle tool in the hands of political elites, one often as dangerous to its wielder as to those within society.  Rather than prepare for objective control against inter-state conflicts, regimes instead co-opted militaries to repress the state’s own citizens and keep the current regime in power.  However, this role made the armed forces just as likely to overthrow the regime when they disagreed with the present policies.

The result has been horrendous civil-military relations within post-colonial sub-Saharan African states.  Rather than a collaborative partnership, the two groups vie for control of the state, with political and economic development often the casualty.  Creating competing military/security structures only worsens the relationship, as additional actors generate greater animosities with no incentive to participate towards constructive partnerships.  Indeed, in many cases the security services merely present yet another challenger for capturing the state.  If African nations ever hope to break out of this coup trap, better civil-military relations are a necessity.  Moving forward, the civil government must reassert control over this hazardous tool, yet in order to do so it must first change the normative discourse of this organizations role in the state.  Only then can it address the professionalization, political neutrality, and freedom from ethnic loyalties that will create a responsible military willing to collaborate in constructive civil-military relations.