Pearl Harbor, WikiLeaks, and Strategic Surprise

69 Years ago last week, the Japanese Navy surprised strategically the United States in their attack on Pearl Harbor Naval Base in Hawaii. That date that will live in infamy along with October 6, 1973, and September 11, 2001 are among the most critical examples of strategic surprise studied for improving national security and establishing effective national intelligence. Some argue that these events show that no matter what measures a country can place in effect, strategic surprise is inevitable. When considering strategic surprise, one cannot only consider the intentions of the attackers, but also consider one’s own intentions, and how well the enemy understands them. WikiLeaks’ airing of the State Department’s cables achieved the desired effect of the rogue website and its founder and, when taken into context with previous strategic surprise, constitutes espionage. Hopefully, the Executive Branch of the US Government will not react to the espionage with measures that will lead to another strategic surprise.

The weirdest source of conspiracy about Pearl Harbor…Michael Jackson?? You have to look at the uber-scary painting on the right.

OK…Back to reality: Pearl Harbor, the Yom Kippur War and 9/11 share commonalities to include commissions by the US and Israel to investigate the causes of their surprises. Pearl Harbor included many, the most comprehensive of which was the “Joint [Congressional] Committee on the Investigation into the Pearl Harbor Attack.” The Israelis enacted the Agranat Commission to investigate the failures to predict the Egyptian and Syrian attack beginning the Yom Kippur (or October) War. Finally, most know of the 9/11 Commission and Report and their effect. Studying the reports will show two critical factors of national intelligence – understanding of intentions (both yours and the enemies), and intelligence sharing among departments and communities.

Wikileaks’ releasing the State Department cables revealed to potential adversaries the United States’ and other countries’ intentions in many different arenas. While some intentions are well-known, known de facto, or common sense, having them on paper eliminates ambiguity for our/their enemies. Those intentions that were meant to be kept a secret are no longer…enough said. People who say “no big deal” or “we already knew this stuff” fail to understand how simple understandings of intentions can change things. For instance, in the October War, the Israeli Defense Forces believed they could predict Egyptian actions because Egypt would have to attack the Israeli Air Forces to prevent the embarrassment of the 1967 war (a “no duh” statement, one would think). Knowing that, the Egyptians merely moved anti-aircraft systems to the Sinai border to protect the ground forces during their surprise. This is the type of information that could be released on the lower “Secret” level documents such as the cables, as opposed to Top Secret stuff.

Each report shares a common thread regarding the sharing of information. The Joint investigation Committee commented on the ineffective transfer of intelligence gathered from MAGIC transcripts from Washington to Hawaii. In fact, the congressional commission reversed earlier claims that the ground commanders in Hawaii were derelict in duty. The Agranat Commission identified stove-piping and too much centralization of influence in the Israeli Military Intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission found the same and instituted similar changes to the others.

The most likely, important, unfortunate, and lasting effect of the Wikileaked documents will be mistrust among departments and countries. As the respective agencies ratchet down on controlling intelligence by means of bureaucratic controls and other inconveniences, information sharing will bog down and intelligence processes will slow. This will directly affect the targeting cycle on the tactical level, and could possibly lead to the next “inevitable” strategic surprise.

These criteria demonstrate that Wikileaks’ actions amount to espionage against the United States. The website’s actions directly and indirectly affect US National Security on tactical and strategic levels. Julian Assange and his conspirators should be considered as enemy spies and treated as such. The soldier, if found guilty, should be tried for treason and espionage. Each should be made an example of, to include the death penalty for the soldier.

A Worthwhile Show of Force?

The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States’ militaries are conducting routine multi-national live fire exercises today amidst a tense situation with North Korea. The continuation of these drills and the plans for further military training exercises amounts to a fair show of force despite North Korean warnings of retaliation. The publicity behind these exercises results from the recent belligerency on the part of North Korea and tough rhetoric reminiscent of the Korean War. With some calling for a cooling of tensions to avoid war, one might ask whether these actions are in the best interests of the shaky ceasefire or in the interests of the US.

Peninsular relations have not been overwhelmingly cordial since the armistice agreement in 1952. Tensions between the two countries have risen and fallen over the decades due to multiple provocative actions. In August of 1976, for instance, North Korean soldiers attacked a group of ROK and US Army soldiers trimming a tree near the Demilitarized Zone, killing two US officers and wounding the other members of the party. The events of the last nine months, however, have amounted to the worst since the end of the war.

The March 2010, sinking of the South Korean vessel Cheonan included ambiguity as North Korea denied sinking the vessel and even wrapped it in a conspiracy involving the US.
Last month, there was no ambiguity when the North fired 170 artillery shells targeting the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, eliciting a response of 80 shells from the South. Some hawks in South Korea are requesting more dramatic escalation, including a request for the US to deploy tactical nukes to the 38th Parallel (Economist). Given Seoul’s proximity to the border, the South is wary that provocation will bring more flagrant responses from the North.

The ROK and US forces should continue to execute training exercises, despite the warnings from Kim Jong Il. While US forces have been so focused on rotating in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the skills of conducting conventional warfare have waned. These drills will increase the forces’ proficiency in properly fighting maneuver warfare, in the unlikely event that the North initiates low level raids or incursions. Meanwhile, Kim family threats, believed by me to be empty, will only reduce the already minimal respect for the North Korean leadership on the world stage.

The US should not, however, egg on the South in an attempt to heighten tensions. Some believe that military action by the South is inevitable as the South is fed up with the North’s actions. While all out war is unlikely, America will have to play a much more nuanced geopolitical game with China. I would not amount our show of force via training exercises as egging on, or as playing Russian roulette with nukes. US-ROK must find a way to come out of these tensions on top, and this will be a symbolic but benign enough way to do so.

Forgetting Something?

Fall is over, winter has come. The semester is all but completely wrapped up. I really have nothing else to worry abou...

HOLY CRAP, I FORGOT TO DO A BLOGPOST ABOUT NORTH KOREA! PANIC!

Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair went on CNN's "State of the Union" yesterday with interesting news: South Korea is losing its patience with North Korea, which will eventually result in further military action.

"I don't think a war is going to start but there will be military action at lower levels," he added.

It is widely believed that if a full scale war were to break out between the Koreas, South Korea would emerge victorious. Despite this, the North Korean government wants nothing more than an increase in tension along the border. Why do they feel secure in instigating South Korea? Why are they stirring up trouble now?

The answer to the first question is two-fold:
1) North Korea has support from China: Despite the leaked U.S. cable including Chinese Foreign Minister He Yafei's claim that North Korea was like a 'spoiled child', China is benefitted in the long run by having power over a misbehaving state. It is unlikely that this relationship will change, despite the flaws in the two countries' relationship. With China involved, there is little chance that this time-tested spat will transform into all-out war.

2) North Korea insists on being strong despite its weakness: Although South Korea's military capability is stronger than that in the North, North Korea is compelled to antagonize the South. This level of crazy isn't just another dig at the Dear Leader (but let's be honest, that's 12 foot of crazy in a 4 foot man). We're talking core government philosophy. "Juche", the leading ideology of North Korea, is best described as an attitude of national self-reliance. Obviously, this chafes with being a client state under China. Juche is undoubtely the reason why North Korea is consistenly labeled as unpredictable, irrational, and foolhardy.

Why now?

I could say "why not?" but there's actually more to it than that. As fellow class blogger "Aurelius" mentioned in this semester's first blog post, it's likely that the North Korean leadership is trying to give credentials to the country's successor, General Kim Jong-un. During the transfer of power from the country's founder to Kim Jong-il, a similar rise in hostilities took place. The totalitarian government of North Korea depends on the perception of a strong leader, which means the past year of military clashes may be more of a PR stunt for a political campaign than earnest attempts at war.

So what does this mean for the short term? South Korea's newly appointed Defense Minister, Kim Kwan-jin, has been increasing military readiness since the most recent artillery bombings. North Korea has unveiled a new facility that enriches uranium. The New York Times has conveniently listed the most likely targets of North Korean aggression.

To slow this military escalation, Washington may consider supporting China's efforts to get the six party talks back on track. Also, Harrison and Cushman have an interesting Op-ed piece in the New York Times that suggests a redrawing of boundaries in the Yellow Sea, conducted by the UN.

Zombies in Context

This past Wednesday we took part in one of the livelier assignments in my academic career. We arrived to the robotics building and were confronted with the unthinkable: zombies—fast ones—were everywhere, and as leaders from a group of countries as well as two non-state entities (Al Qaeda and Wikileaks) we were tasked with sorting out this fetid nightmare. Admittedly the exercise had its lighter moments, like jokes about Julian Assange’s proclivities and all things Putin (the phrase “one riot, one ranger” should be amended to say “one zombie horde, one Putin”), but I’d like to focus for a moment on why the zombie frame is as useful as it is entertaining.

Since Danny Drezner first did the zombie thing this summer in preparation for his book, I’ve always thought of it as a really evocative way to contend with the prospects of a pandemic in this age of globalization. Consider it just for a moment. In the event of a rapidly advancing disease of unprecedented virulence, nation-states would very well behave with the same motivations that we did while contending with the walking, swimming, running dead. Would China, Russia, or the U.S. be forthcoming about the extent of its problem? Would pursuit of a cure be made more complicated by the difficulties of international coordination in the midst of crisis? Would the trend of increased urbanization in recent human history turn out to be a curse? To some degree, these questions came up in our simulation, but they would also be of paramount importance if we were to experience anything approaching the great influenza of 1918.

If you think this sounds crazy, I humbly suggest you read John M. Barry’s The Great Influenza, detailing a truly horrific chapter in human history. As I read Drezner’s article in Foreign Policy I was frequently brought back to Barry’s book. You could argue that a zombie outbreak, comical as it sounds, is just a more cinematic version of influenza.

Barry’s book is fantastic and constantly reminds the reader that disease is not an anachronistic concern. In 1918 the flu killed more people in 24 weeks than AIDS killed in 24 years. In the Indian sub-continent nearly 20 million died, a mortality rate of 10.4% was a reality. That means a modern flu half as virulent as the 1918 variety could kill 700,000 in modern day Mumbai.

Barry’s book, particularly the afterword, speaks directly to our chosen paths at Patterson, so much so, that I’d like to see it on the reading list next summer. Another 1918 would require massive effort on the part of our security establishment, our scientific community, healthcare apparatus, and our diplomatic corps. All that effort would be mobilized against something that could not be reasoned with or easily explained to nervous populations.

Science fiction and horror work best when they use the impossible and the macabre to make us think critically about our own reality. Let's just hope that the CDC director is a George Romero fan.

Tropical Conquest

Costa Rica is a wonderful country. It really is a shame that it has been occupied by the Nicaraguan army.

Costa Rica has one of the strongest economies in Latin America, is active in international human rights, and is THE place to go if you want to see volcanoes, white sand beaches, rainforests, and tapirs. Nicaragua, on the other hand, is one of the poorest countries in Latin America with a long history of violence and corruption. In fact, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega was recently mentioned in a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable (courtesy of WikiLeaks) that claimed he was using illegal drug money to fund campaigns for his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Costa Rica and Nicaragua have had disagreements in the past, but their recent territorial dispute has got to be one of the silliest.

Last month, Nicaraguan troops crossed the Costa Rican border because they received the real world equivalent of Monopoly's "bank error in your favor, collect $200" card. Google maps, the world's premier free online map system had goofed, accidentally ceding approximately 3 kilometers of Costa Rica's Isla Calero to Nicaragua. Nicaraguan government officials, instead of accepting the computer error for what it is, have claimed that this is all the justification that they need to take possession of the land. Costa Rica is unable to respond militarily because it constitutionally abolished its army in 1949. Because of this, Costa Rica has been forced to appeal to international organizations in order to resolve the issue, despite the clear cut nature of the situation. Google maps is not the final authority on border disputes, I'm sure of it. I can only assume that Costa Ricans feel like Mugatu in this scene here.

Costa Rica has appealed to the Organization of American States (OAS) to help resolve the issue, and has received support from a vast majority of the member nations. On November 12, The OAS ordered Nicaragua to remove its troops from the disputed territory in order to facilitate a negotiation between the two countries. President Ortega refused to comply. On December 7, the OAS issued a second order for Nicaragua to leave the area, again to no avail. The OAS does not have the power to ultimately decide on border disputes, so it seems that Costa Rica's only option is to wait until January 11, when the International Court of Justice at the Hague holds a court hearing.

While Costa Rica has been waiting for the OAS to produce results, Nicaragua has been busy building a canal in the disputed region that will be connected to Lake Nicaragua. Also, the Nicaraguan government is pushing for a National Security Law that would give it the legal grounds to officially declare Costa Rica a "threat to national security." The proposed legislation is in response to Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla's remark last week, when she stated that she considers Nicaragua to be an "enemy" to Costa Rica. Nicaraguan government official Francisco Aguirre said that such statements were bellicose and erratic. He said, "She's acting more Nicaraguan than Costa Rican."

Hilarious.

This whole situation makes me wonder whether noted pacifist, author, and military expert Paul Chappell is right. He said we should utilize shame instead of violence against the world's wrongdoers. I think the OAS's ability to evoke shame has proven itself ineffective in this matter and that the Nicaraguan leadership could withstand any amount of shame thrown its way if it means it gets to build useful infrastructure on someone else's land and reap the economic benefits as a result. If and when the International Court of Justice finally decides the issue, Nicaragua will not be leaving the area empty handed.

Russia and the Caucasus Flashpoint

Russia is allowing/supporting the creation of a new Dagestani military/paramilitary force in an attempt to improve the security situation in that region of the war-torn Caucasus. This is an unfortunate development in a region that many argue is the most significant hot spot and the most likely venue for the next high-intensity conflict. It also comes at a time of apparent regression of the professionalism and modernization of the Russian Army by means of decreasing conscription. This unrest directly affects American interests as we continue to invest in Georgia’s future.
Russia’s Dagestan Province suffers from the Islamist militant movement that has overwhelmed much of the Northern Caucasus Region. The Interior Ministry has conducted raids in the region with mixed success, while the interagency security forces in the province have lost 104 members this year. Because of the losses, Russia seems to have taken a lesson from the “Awakening” or “Sons of Iraq” program from Iraq. This includes the formation of “3 Battalions” of forces (numbering only 700-800, the size of one American Battalion) made up completely of locals. This apparently follows a similar model the Russians used with Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya and may be relying on training from some of the Chechen forces. Putin is even personally getting involved.
This comes in the midst of major reforms in the Russian Army regarding personnel and equipment. The State Armaments Program 2020 has driven some of the initiative as the military is trying to modernize 70% of their equipment. The likelihood of this attempt is based on the forecast of constant rising prices of oil and that the Russian Military Industry can actually build what it is asked. Furthermore, money continues to be redirected to the strategic forces to ensure the prestige of nuclear arms.
The other prong of Russian reform lies in the professionalization of its soldiers. This includes an attempt to dramatically reduce the officer to enlisted ratio, and to reduce the percentage of conscripted soldiers. The contract vs. conscription rate argument has gone for more than two decades, even with a recent discussion on adopting a Swiss model of citizen-soldiery. Ill-discipline and hazing have caused many in the Russian military to argue strongly for a contract force, but many have said that it is easier to control the draftees than the contracted.
Back to Dagestan: In what is clearly the most important security front for the Russians, the shortcomings of military reform are being detailed in blood. When the MOD comes up short, the MVD attempts to fill the gaps, further complicating the arguments for modernization money for the military. Meanwhile, they continue to play games with the movement of tactical nukes on the European border and pushing for missile defense. The US should be concerned that their biggest NATO project, Georgia, lies so close to such a boiling flashpoint.

Terrorism | The Big Elusive Kahoona: Sports Stadiums

I love going to football games at Commonwealth Stadium. There's nothing better than hanging out in the parking lot with good friends, eating some good food, maybe playing a little cornhole, then heading in amidst a sea of blue and white and finding my seat as the band plays On, On, U of K. Indeed, football is a fundamental part of the American way of life and each fall millions of fans gather in stadiums across the US to support their teams and continue this great American tradition.

From a security perspective though, you know what is interesting? You never really hear about terrorists targeting football stadiums (or any US sports stadiums for that matter), save during the lead up to the Super Bowl each year. We all know security is extremely tight for the Super Bowl, but what about the hundreds of games before the Super Bowl? Now that I think about it, I can't remember when the targeting of sports stadiums during the regular football seasons was a subject of discussion of a news segment or Sunday morning talk show or anything. I can't recall reading anything about the targeting of sports stadiums during the regular seasons either. In fact, the only time I can think of sports stadium terrorism being addressed by mass media (again, the Super Bowl aside) is toward the end of the 2001 movie The Sum Of All Fears, when a terrorist nuclear bomb detonates during a Baltimore Ravens game, killing thousands and almost setting off a nuclear war between the US and Russia. Thank the Lord Jack Ryan was there to save the day.

A quick Google search reveals some thought on the issue, an article written by private security firm CEO here, a Time media segment on sports terrorism there. But nothing comparable to what you'd think would be found for such a obvious and devastating potential threat. Terrorism discussion seems to focus on airplanes and airports, the presidential inauguration, and other big events, along with critical government infrastructure in Washington.

So is the targeting of sports stadiums across the US just not really that big of a deal? Not a serious threat? I would think it would be, and I'm sure there are plenty of security folks who would agree. Any one of the hundreds of sports stadiums across the US would seem like a perfect target. Take Commonwealth Stadium, home of the Kentucky Wildcats, as an example. The stadium has a capacity of 67,606, more than four times the average number of people in and around the towers on September 11. There are hundreds of staff, players, and workers in and out of the stadium during any given week with little to no obvious security in place (hopefully it's there and we just don't know about it). There is no real force protection at the crowd entrances during the games, unless you call this security; yes, they check your coats and bags, however, I'm thinking about a couple vans and some fertilizer at 60 miles-an-hour. And again, Commonwealth Stadium is just one among hundreds of stadiums filled with people each Saturday during the fall football seasons.

The objective of terrorism is to attack a civilian population in order to create political and economic disruption. The attack itself is secondary to its after affects. Fear is the terrorist's primary weapon, bombs are just the method used to achieve their end. If one or two stadiums were attacked, not only would the enormous concentration of people allow for maximum causalities, but the economic aftermath would be devastating to the industry. A very plausible scenario in which after a major terrorist attack on a stadium Americans are afraid to attend games, attendance drops by forty and fifty percent (if not more), games are canceled, the lost revenue is in the billions, etc. can be imagined. This is all not to mention the effect on the

American psych; a foundation of American life would be shook to the core. The fear affect would be even greater if a stadium like Commonwealth were to be attacked, because "if it can happen there, in Kentucky, then it can happen anywhere." When asked why he chose his location, the potential bomber of the Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon, last week said, "because nothing ever happens there."

Over 3,000 people were killed on September 11, with approximately another 6,000 were injured, in a terrorist attack that changed the US and the world forever. For 9 years now, the American security establishment has been thinking up ways to prevent the next 9/11, yet it seems that a major vulnerability is not being addressed, at least in the public discourse.

And if as a result of this blog post, UK hires someone to beef up security at Commonwealth Stadium, please don't let it be the guy who came up with this idea (see picture above).

Domestic Counter-Insurgency Operations Present Opportunities for Mil-Mil Cooperation

Over Thanksgiving, Brazil pushed forward aggressively with its pacification of violent slums outside of Rio de Janeiro. This pacification strategy is a counterinsurgency pursued as a police action, albeit with a fair amount of support from the regular military.

The violence and depravity of the Brazilian favelas (which are only the most “colorful” of the Latin American shanty towns) was immortalized in the film City of God (“Cidade de Deus”), which only hinted at disconnect between Brazil’s main cities, namely Rio de Janeiro, and these slums. Saying that gangs thrived here is an understatement. Local governments unwilling to do what was necessary to push back the narco-gangs gradually ceded ground and authority to these criminal elements. Soon enough, gangs oversaw the black market economies and became the embodiment the law. This sorry state was made worse by corrupt policing and random indiscriminate violence on the part Rio’s law enforcement.

Things started to turn earlier this year. On June 10^th The Economist ran a story on the seeds of an improbable turnaround in the City of God. Police took the favela back and as opposed to returning the precincts of Rio, they stayed. The articles shows that as of June 2010, there had been one murder in the City of God, compared to 29 in all of the preceding year. The combined police and military actions of Thanksgiving weekend took things even further. Tell me that this does not sound familiar:

“Pacification involves an ultimatum to the gangs to leave, followed by months of heavy patrols and then the arrival of new, specially trained recruits who provide 24-hour community policing. Though there is still plenty of drug dealing in pacified favelas it is discreet and the dealers no longer carry heavy weapons. There are far fewer murders, and other crimes, such as child prostitution, fall too. The plan is that with the UPPs come better schools, health care and leisure facilities. Many gangsters are illiterate teenagers with few other options.”

While this is the not the first time COIN has been performed domestically, basic history of the region explains that; this is the first time to my knowledge that it has been largely framed as a police action. Furthermore, it is, at least based on what I’ve read, one of the more successful Latin American counterinsurgencies in terms of integrating into the disgruntled populace and learning to distinguish hardened narco-operatives from pissed off teenagers.

Which brings me the issue voiced in the title of this post: could similar operations present an opportunity for Mil-Mil participation in the future? We hear a lot about the importance of confidence building measures and participation between our allies and us. But this usually involves our Navy working with others. Perhaps this is another avenue, where by we use our hard earned background in COIN to build positive inter-security relationships with emerging regional powers like Brazil. The only downside would be the intimacy we’d develop abroad and the image that could generate at home and abroad. Still, it is an issue worth debating.

Also…the Brazilians aren’t just doing this for the World Cup/Olympics, although it’s certainly a reason. Rio looks to be the hub of its petroleum export business, so sprucing all of it up for foreign eyes will crucial for the long-term economic picture.

A Tale of Two Wikileaks

So first came the Afghan War Diary.

Then the Iraq War Logs.

And I made the case for accepting, if not being proud, that our country could absorb such a leak and emerge without walking through hellfire. The first two leaks buttressed the fact that our journalists are clever and on target most of the time – nothing new was revealed that an astute observe had not already had inklings of. In class we further discussed the implications of such a leak on military operations and safety, and I modified my position on the Wikileaks. But I was not convinced to condemn quite yet. I still saw value in the fact that such information was dropped on the US with little effect.

Then came the Great Diplo-Dump – aka Cablegate

Assange probably purposefully chose the name with “gate” in it to evoke Watergate, which brings back memories of executive overreaching and crooks. But Cablegate, in my opinion, doesn’t make the President or the State Department look bad. To the contrary, it tells the tale of honest and frank diplomats, writing home what they were sent abroad to observe. I see nothing nefarious in the cables.

But again, I am forced by new information to modify my position.

While the two war-related leaks were targeted in their scope, this recent leak has such a wide range and long-lasting effects. Eventually the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will end, and what crucial information was leaked will not really matter anymore. The effect of the cable leak is on the perception of America in the world, particularly on our ability (or non-ability) to keep secure diplomatic confidentiality. A good reputation is difficult to build, and easy to destroy.

And reputations are even more difficult to rebuild.

While the public has merely been reaffirmed of its notions, American diplomats worldwide face serious issues of trust. What the public gained does not match what it has cost, and will cost, our diplomatic endeavors. If a journalist publishes the names of his sources when asked not to, he soon finds that he has no sources. Diplomats operate on a similar basis, speaking freely to each other knowing the ground rules are strong. Now that the ground has shook, foreign diplomats may be justifiably more wary to speak frankly to the US.

What progress has been made in transparency between government agencies, breadth of discussion with foreign countries, and developing a diplomatic corps dedicated to discretion and honest conversation with their counterparts as well as with the home base has been set back. We can already say goodbye to State and Defense sharing of information, State has been burned and putting its walls back up. We shall see how this affects the way other countries talk to us, though I hope that remains a secret and we only figure it out once we’ve all become gainfully employed by the man. The diplomats, I hope, will remain strong and stuck to their values of discretion and perhaps more importantly frankness. Honest discourse with the State Dept back home is key and hopefully none of our diplomats will be intimidated by potential leak into sugarcoating their cables from now on. Honesty is most useful bitter and untainted.

So I suppose the end game is this: Reputation is everything, trust is everything. 

And mea culpa with regards to my former pride in wikileaks, accept my apologies o’ anonymous colleagues of mine. I do indeed prefer honesty and frank intra- and inter-governmental dialogue to full public exposure.Though I may still be strangely proud of our ability to handle this and move forward without overt governmental spasms.

SPACE: The Final Frontier

For militarization, anyway.

Early Friday morning, USA-212, the maiden voyage of the Air Force's highly secretive X-37B, concluded as the unmanned space plane touched down at Vandenburg Air Force Base. A second X-37 is on order from Boeing to be delivered this spring, and due to the lack of life support systems or rocket stages to corral, the first X-37 could be ready for flight again soon.

Of course, the question is why? Despite the fact the mission itself has been public knowledge, the objectives haven't, though the Air Force promises that all of them were met. The X-37 began life as a NASA program in 1999 as a space shuttle replacement before being taken over by the Air Force. Descriptions of the plane's capabilities have been hard to come by since 2001, when Boeing stated that it could remain in space for three weeks at a time. Obviously, over the course of the decade, its capabilities have expanded considerably, as USA-212 was a seven month mission that apparently could have gone on longer. Several Air Force officials admitted not knowing when the craft was due for its return. The Air Force maintains the missions were essentially scientific lab work, but refuses to outline what they were.

If they were indeed for the advancement of science, why the secrecy? Theories have run from testing new weapons systems to destroying or commandeering enemy satellites. Whatever the case, the path of the craft was changed several times to prevent curious amateur astronomers from tracking it. Personally, I find the premise of a "Rods from God" weapons system to be the most science fictionally appealing. But, as the craft has storage about the size of the bed of a pickup truck, this seems unlikely. Disappointingly, it is likely the Air Force is at least mostly telling the truth, and the X-37B was testing new sensors.

Nevertheless, the possible military nature of the X-37B ought to raise some concerns. This might not be the first time space has been militarized with possible space-to-space weapons, but modern militarization by the US could set a dangerous precedent. Interestingly, it might fly in the face of a proclamation from the earliest days of the Obama Administration that the US would seek a space weapons ban. Satellites and platforms like the X-37B certainly represent the kind of dual-use hardware that would make enforcing any ban tricky. In fact, the secrecy may be a means to head-off controversy under a future weapons ban regime. The X-37B controversy itself brings to mind our rebuke of China using a ground-based missile to shoot down an aging satellite, followed a year later by our own sea-based destruction of a falling satellite to protect global denizens from "toxic fuel." Obfuscation or claims of a higher purpose seem to be thinly-veiled efforts to hide the obvious military applications of these space ventures.

A space arms race is likely over the horizon, especially as China continues to rise. With the Chinese closing the UAV gap, it seems it will be only a matter of time before they seek parity with the US in unmanned spacecraft. This leaves two clear options for the US in its handling of missions like USA-212.

The first is to deal with greater transparency in the missions. If the X-37B has been merely testing new sensors, even if they are of a classified nature, just say that. American spy satellite technology remains the most classified of government information, but the nation is not threatened by the fact everyone knows they exist. So too, the X-37B will seem less menacing if its mission objectives are clear, even if foreign militaries remain suspicious. Knowledge of the mission without knowing its purpose only leads to the sort of rampant conspiracy theorizing a quick Google search will reveal.

The second option is to just maintain secrecy entirely. Although this might seem futile, given that with modern consumer technology even amateur astronomers can find the X-37B in the night sky, not giving them a target to look for would greatly curtail the conspiracy theories. We maintain plausible deniability on plenty of things, such as the shadow war in Yemen, despite the fact it's well-known to those who have an interest. There's no reason the X-37B should be any different.

The existence and hypotheses surrounding the X-37B provide a big problem for the Obama Administration. Given its strong stance on nuclear weapons and an early, though apparently quietly tabled position on the militarization of space, ongoing military missions in orbit seem decidedly hypocritical. It also poses a problem for US civil-military relations on who should dictate how the US enters into an entirely new age and arena of warfare. The question is writ even larger by the fact a program now with dual-use implications was once under the civilian control of NASA, which has simultaneously also seen budget cuts so savage that the astronaut's days may be numbered. It seems the military-industrial complex is stretching into infinity, and beyond.

The US can either choose to head off the expansion of weapons in space by leading the effort on a ban or seek to gain an early lead in what will inevitably become a heated arms race. The former is idealistic and inexpensive, the latter more pragmatic and will prove incredibly exorbitant. Either way, space will ultimately prove the final frontier for either political resolve, military operations, or both.

Leaked Cables? What Leaked Cables?

Yesterday evening, news broke that the Obama administration had warned federal government employees to refrain from downloading or linking to any of the recently leaked diplomatic cables currently available on Wikileaks. The Office of Management and Budget, who sent the notice out on Friday, justified this directive by including this in the notice: "classified information, whether or not already posted on public websites or disclosed to the media, remains classified, and must be treated as such by federal employees and contractors."

I would argue that if the information is being perused by every foreign government, allies and enemies alike, we should not be concerned with our own people being aware of the gossip taking place at the international water cooler. By forbidding federal employees from learning about the damage as a result of WikiLeaks firsthand, the US government is effectively telling its own employees that they aren't to be trusted. Furthermore, if I were a soldier, and the top brass told me to not look at the leaked cables, I would worry that the cables held information that would affect me directly, information that my enemies would have complete access to while I'm completely oblivious.

To be fair, the notice mentioned that federal employees will still be able to read news stories about the leaked cables. But these secrets aren't secrets anymore. The Obama administration should accept that.

On another note, schools such as Columbia University are pressuring their Diplomacy students to not access the leaked cables on WikiLeaks because it "would call into question [their] ability to deal with confidential information."

I could point out that this wouldn't even be an issue if the federal government itself had correctly dealt with the confidential information in the first place, but that would be a low blow. Instead I'll say this: because I want a fancy government job one day, I'll steer clear of the cables and only read what the New York Times has vetted. But there are many interested parties who would use these thousands of documents against the US if they could. If such nefarious scheming is taking place, I'm sure they are delighted to know that the only people kept in the dark is us.

Wikileaks and the future of national security IT

It all started with a CD with "Lady Gaga" written on it.

With that simple disk and the assistance of the Wikileaks website and a willing media, US Pfc. Bradley Manning (see photo to the right, in all its chipmunk-cheeked glory) accomplished the largest known unveiling of US confidential documents. From a transcript of his online conversation with hacker Adrian Lamo (who turned Manning in), Manning was shocked by how easy his crimes were:

(01:56:07 PM) Bradley Manning: i didnt even have to hide anything
(02:15:03 PM) Bradley Manning: pretty simple, and unglamorous
(02:17:56 PM) Bradley Manning: weak servers, weak logging, weak physical security, weak counter-intelligence, inattentive signal analysis... a perfect storm

(02:44:47 PM) Bradley Manning: the network was upgraded, and patched up so many times... and systems would go down, logs would be lost... and when moved or upgraded... hard drives were zeroed
(02:45:12 PM) Bradley Manning: its impossible to trace much on these field networks...
(02:46:10 PM) Bradley Manning: and who would honestly expect so much information to be exfiltrated from a field network?

Who indeed. It raises the thought: If Manning could do it, why couldn't others? The same thought is roiling the world of national security IT, whose overlords werer pressured in the post-9/11 world to lower barriers between systems as a way to encourage information sharing, or "connecting the dots." Yet now it appears that Manning's folly is forcing politicians, bureaucrats and IT managers to raise walls and cut ties.

The Obama Office of Management and Budget issued a one-page memo calling for tighter security practices. In particular, the memo calls for a restriction on the range of information available to a user, or a "broader access than is necessary to do their jobs effectively." The Defense Department has already pushed forward, tightening access to system, including restrictions on the use of removal media exploited by Manning.

This type of restriction is not even a US phenomenon. The WikiLeaks fiasco, as well as a well-publicized leak of classified Israeli documents to an Israel newspaper, led Israel to take similar steps to clamp down on how its secrets are accessed. The US incident is also serving as a reminder to US businesses what happens when you don't keep watch over your information.

How this leak happened is clear. Yet as this ZDNet debunking clearly shows, Manning's exploitation of an open system was a failure to use available resources to secure an IT infrastructure:

Well, the problem is that in this case, the US Army didn’t deploy NetTop 2 for the workstations that Private Manning had access to in Iraq. Instead, he had access to two laptops, with functional DVD writers which were directly connected to the SIPRNet and JWICS, not through secure, isolated virtual desktop sessions.

This resulted in a chink in the armor that was exposed to the wrong type of person — a mentally unstable, angry young 22-year old Army Private who had carte blanche capability to copy and suck down everything from SIPRNet and the JWICS that he could get his grubby little hands on.

So what now? As I stated, the gates will shut and the doors will close. But its doubtful those steps lead to the establishment of a truly responsible IT security regime, since the rules in place would have stopped the Manning leak if they had been properly followed. It's impossible to legislate a cure to laziness.

Perhaps for a time the walls will remain up. Yet convenience and the needs of the moment will eventually open the door to another breach. It will happen. As long as the IT infrastructure of national security can fall victim to laziness, it's only a matter of time.

Don't Ask

The ongoing debate in the lame duck Congress on repeal of DADT has been buried under the media blitz on WikiLeaks. Regardless, the debate continues to rage on. Most notable Senator John McCain has taken up the flag of those who oppose repeal and has misspoken in attempts to discredit his opposition, namely Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen.

The most recent arguments in the anti-repeal camp stems from a Pentagon survey of 115,000 active-duty and reserve service members. While 58% of Marine and 48% of Army combat troops were opposed to repeal, the wider survey including combat and noncombat troops found that 70% believed there would be either positive impact, mixed, or no consequence by repealing DADT. (And yes, statistics are usually useless and bullshit but these highlight the various angles from which you could take this issue.)

In this clip Mullen, McCain and Gates spar on the issue. One of the key things mentioned is that throughout the history of our civilian-led military never once have troops been asked how they feel about a policy shift. No one asks if servicemen and women want 15-month terms, or if they want to go to war in country X, Y, and/or Z. The poll itself is unusual and shows that at the widest taking, there is acceptance if not encouragement to repeal DADT.

I have heard the argument that the military is not ready, that the procedures for mitigating complaints are not in place. Well of course they aren’t in place. The military will not spend time developing plans to roll back a policy that has not been repealed. Only when DADT is repealed can the military begin planning the how of it.

One of Gate’s comments was directed at the fact that many combat troops were in their early 20s and had relatively little experience in the military. While resistant to change, Gates believes their objections and concerns are not insurmountable. 

“With time and adequate preparation, we can mitigate their concerns,” Gates said

The above quote indicates to me that rather than immediate reversal, Congressional repeal of DADT would be followed by serious consideration of how to implement repeal. That conversation will not and cannot take place until after the law is changed.

Gates and Mullen made the plea for Congress to repeal the law, allowing for the necessary planning to implement such a policy. If Congress does not do this, the courts could at any moment hear a case and force overturn of the law by declaring it unconstitutional – such a move would give the military no time to develop and implement repeal. Preparation would be necessary to implement repeal and only Congressional repeal allows for that time to mitigate the concerns of service members.

I couldn’t disagree more with McCain’s response to the idea of being able to mitigate, with time and preparation, the concerns expressed by service members.

 “Well, I couldn’t disagree more,” Mr. McCain shot back. “We send these young people into combat; we think they’re mature enough to fight and die. I think they’re mature enough to make a judgment on who they want to serve with and the impact on their battle effectiveness.”

It treads dangerously close to an anti-integration argument in my mind (not to mention an argument made time and again by 19-20 year olds for lowing the drinking age, but that's neither here nor there). Having known a number of young men who dropped out of college to join the military I do not think all of these people are mature or give much thought beyond their personal disposition toward the gay community when asked about this issue. Certainly many service members are mature, every single one here in our program is of outstanding character and intellect, but to base a policy change on the whims and prejudices of 20-year olds is ridiculous

Similarly ridiculous is McCain’s argument that speaking from personal experience makes him an authority on the matter. McCain’s military service while certainly admirable is no more so than that of  Mullen who claimed to have served with gays aboard a destroyer in Vietnam and experienced no impact on the ability of the crew to carry out their missions.

The only criteria for military service should be love of this country, willingness and ability to serve. We need to continue down the path toward that standard and have our military reflect the national values of freedom which we seek to defend. Congress must give the military leaders what they are asking for: the go-head to plan and implement further integration of the armed forces to reflect the populace and values of our nation.