The End is Near?.. Still?

Within a month the last version of the START Treaty will expire. There is not much hope of a START III being ratified and in place before then. This is not too shocking. It is not even extremely necessary for one to be in place before the 5th. Nevertheless, this negotiation is an interesting element in the developing US-Russian relationship. Given the former President’s decision to withdraw from the START talks several years ago, replacing it with SORT, the Obama administration, in their attempts at engagement, are coming closer and closer to finalizing a deal. Overall these negotiations can function as a great foil to judge the current US-Russian dynamics.

First, the irony of the situation is somewhat comical. Here we have hawkish Russia going up against a current Nobel Laureate… but instead of the hawks looking for more arms it’s the Laureate who wants to keep the nukes. Russia, with limited leverage in the negotiations, is asking for a greater reduction in some arms than the US. Granted, this decision is not Obama’s alone, but the irony still remains. Of course, this deal going through could end up being a great platform for Obama to accept his award on December 10th. Either way, the main point is the limited room Russia has to really negotiate. Bilateral talks? Yes. Equal? No.

The second point builds on first. The reopening of the START talks, given the limited ability of Russia to negotiate, shows the shift in US foreign policy. One of the main problems with the START negotiations - since Clinton - has been the definition and use of missile defense systems. Sounds familiar right? On paper START is only concerned with offensive weapons, but what is defensive to one is offensive to another. There are still several other issues at stake here. Questions of transparency, subs, bombers… But the question remains, why should the US be looking at giving up any of these strategic deterrents given the decaying and asymmetrical advantage it has over Russia? It would seem that one reason is because Obama values his relationship with Russia and because he is taking seriously his goals of nonproliferation. Maybe that Nobel Peace Prize will get ratified too.

Is Japan no longer a constant in US relations in East Asia?

Ahead of Obama's visit to Japan next week, an ongoing dispute between the US and the new administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama regarding the relocation of a Marine base threatens to further strain the long-standing US-Japan alliance.

The impetus for moving U.S. Marines Corps Air Station Futenma grew out of the local population's opposition to the presence of US forces on Okinawa Island. Such opposition seemingly came to a head following the 1995 rape of an Okinawan Schoolgirl by three US servicemen from the base. In 2006, a long awaited deal was reached between the previous administrations of both states that scrapped US plans for constructing an off-shore facility vehemently opposed by environmental groups. The new agreement planned to make use of an existing site, Camp Schwab. Since taking office, the Hatoyama Administration has taken up the issue anew, ignoring Washington's claims that the agreement struck with the then-ruling Liberal Democratic Party was final. More recently, Tokyo has rebuffed US efforts to pressure the reach a decision prior to Obama's arrival.

The deadlock regarding this issue is only the latest decision by Japan's new ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in a string of maneuvers seemingly intent on asserting Japan's foreign policy independence from the United States. Last month, the new administration revealed that it will not renew Japan's Afghan support mission, an eight year agreement to refuel warships supporting US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the DPJ recently shrugged off Defense Secretary Gate's concerns about the Hatoyama Administration's probe into an allegedly secret US-Japan nuclear pact, which had allowed the US to transport nuclear weapons through Japan in violation of the 1960 bilateral security treaty. Additionally, the new administration in Tokyo has made noise about a new East Asian Community with China at its core and the US removed from its current balancing rule in the region.

For some, this apparent insubordination on the part of the DPJ has come as no surprise. The party's election platform foreshadowed such. Moreover, the Futenma issue is the Hatoyama Administration's first foreign affairs test, a chance to back campaign promise targeting a sizable portion of the population desiring a more confident, independent Japanese foreign policy. The question is this just politics? Maybe so. After all, a cornerstone of the DPJ's domestic agenda was to decrease the bureaucratization of government, by empowering elected politicians over the bureaucrats that had too often welded the power in Japanese politics. Will this domestic posturing ultimately lead to an actual crisis in US-Japanese relations? If so, will economic ties endure?

Religion as a Factor in the Fort Hood Shootings

I feel that it’s appropriate for someone to mention the Fort Hood shootings. Nidal Malik Hasan killed 13 people and injured 30 others during a shooting spree on Thursday. What makes this incident so disturbing is that he was a trained psychiatrist and an Army major. Dr. Hasan was not only well-educated but also highly integrated into the institutions of the military. Taking up arms against fellow soldiers would be unthinkable for a person of Hasan’s status unless he felt an extreme disconnection between himself and his comrades. As the reports about Hasan’s background keep filtering in, it is becoming increasingly apparent that this was in fact the case.

Most major media outlets have reported that Hasan was a Muslim who felt increasingly persecuted in the military because of his religion. He attended prayers at least once a day, seven days a week, and acquaintances at both Fort Hood and Walter Reed Medical Center (where he worked previously) have said that he never really fit in. Several papers have also reported that he had expressed sympathy for suicide bombers and loathed the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan for being unjustified. Also, relatives close to Dr. Hasan said that he was terrified of getting deployed to Afghanistan at the end of November. You can read more about his background here.

There is a lot of speculation about Dr. Hasan’s motives. The prominent theory right now is that his time working with sufferers of Post-Traumatic-Stress-Disorder amplified his fear of deployment. Finding out that he was being sent to Afghanistan finally pushed him over the edge.

However, the main policy relevant implication of this event is the issue of Muslims in the military. The main question that will come out of all of this is whether or not a Muslim soldier can perform his role in the armed services as well as a soldier of some other confession. This question is only relevant because the ethos of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is ending Islamic extremism. If the US were involved in a counter-insurgency in East Asia, Dr. Hasan’s religious beliefs would not be very relevant. In that case, he would just be a maniac.

So is Dr. Hasan an extremist or just a maniac? Did Dr. Hasan’s extremism preceded his isolation, or did his isolation pushed him to extremes. For what it is worth, I think that his feelings of isolation most likely came first. I doubt that he would have willingly joined the military if he was so passionately against the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. His social isolation, combined with the stress of working with PTSD sufferers and feelings of persecution, most likely pushed him close to the edge, and his deployment to Afghanistan was enough to push him over it.

Soldiers need to maintain a strong sense of national identity. As long as a soldier identifies himself as an American citizen before he identifies himself as a member of a confession, there really is no conflict of interest between his religion and his country because his country will always come first. Regardless, Dr. Hasan’s problem was not that he was a muslim; Islamic extremism was just a vector though which he channeled his frustration and anger.

As more information becomes available, the reason for Dr. Hasan’s rampage may become more apparent. I look forward to other people’s opinions on the matter.

Bilateral Dilemma

It is strongly held by many that unilateral actions lay way for conflicting relations among allies as well as organized committees and organizations. The question is, is there a time and a place where unilateral movements can present themselves as the bearer of progress more so than progressive conflict. Can the United States act, in a way, on its own and assuming positive outcomes have its actions embraced? Or are the powers of the world too caught up in prestige and ego, not able to recognize that in more instances than not the US can, and should, take on the theoretical role of primus inter pares for the benefit of all?

Here using these thoughts to address the current predicament internationally with addressing North Korea. The UN unanimously condemned North Korea after their failed satellite attempt, in April 2009, resulting in N. Korea pulling out of the continuing six party talks and resuming its nuclear weapons program; the talks being attended by South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, North Korea and the United States. Following former President Bush’s including North Korea in the label “axis of evil” the N Koreans reiterated their concern that having a nuclear weapons program was their only way of preventing a US attack on their soil, their only bargaining chip that they would not give up.

Now November North Korea has reportedly (NY Times Nov 2) made moves in once again pursuing talks, most likely in hopes of acquiring humanitarian aid, diplomatic recognition, decrease in current sanctions imposed upon them, and the list goes on. The problem for the US is that North Korea has expressed through Ri Gun, the diplomat on US affairs that they wish to first negotiate with the US before returning to the multilateral audience. They have stated that they are at a point where they are “ready to go their own way” with the nuclear weapons program if the US does not show an interest in taking advantage of the opportunity to talk. The US has taken the stance that they will not further engage with North Korea until they agree to return to the multilateral talks, therefore presenting a variation of the timeless dilemma, what comes first the chicken or the egg?

In a continued probing for US action this week North Korea reported that they have completed the transformation of plutonium into weapons grade bomb material and will also begin enriching uranium. They do so in what they call a move to “strengthen their self defense nuclear deterrent” due to the nuclear gains of hostile powers. It is worth noting that the N Korean war head Taep’o-dong 2, if ever fully developed is reportedly capable of reaching North America. So again the dilemma remains. It seems logical that the US should, given the opportunity act in these bilateral talks and attempt to make progress at disarmament; however given the international community and the fragile relationships can the US do so without causing friction? Is the move by North Korea to first only engage the US a discrete attempt at unsettling even further, the political relationships among powers? Or in this instance would United States action to pursue nuclear talks be embraced by the multifaceted community?

Demo-crazy

Afghanistan has unraveled week by week. Most recently with Abdullah Abdullah withdrawing his name from the runoff election. The obvious impact is how this will affect President Obama's decision to acquiesce to General McChrystal's request for more troops. I'm not convinced that it will. In the end, I think the troops will be sent. However, I wonder how this is going to affect public opinion and the opinion of our allies.

It just doesn't look good. Karzai gets re-"elected" with massive accusations of corruption. The next scene is Senator John Kerry with his arm around Karzai whispering in his ear about how he really should do a runoff. And now Abdullah backs out on the basis that there is no way that a free and fair election is going to take place.

Like I said before, I think President Obama will send the troops. But additional troops equal additional re-commitment. But frankly, I'm not convinced that there is enough gas left in the public-opinion-tank to stay committed in Afghanistan. Although, Obama has backed away from Bush's policy of establishing a Western democracy in Afghanistan, I still think that the American public has little patience for sending more soldiers and more money to support a government that is largely deemed illegitimate.

Especially more money...

The aid going to Afghanistan has been wasted terribly and even suspicion that it gets diverted to the people we are trying to get rid of. How does the White House convince the American people that money should be poured into Afghanistan when it could be spent on domestic projects?

VADER, to the Rescue in Afghanistan!

The latest from DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is out! A new aerial sensor, called VADER (I know, right?), or Vehicle Dismount and Exploitation Radar, serves to detect and track bombs and eventually individuals on the battlefield in Afghanistan. The system employs digital tracking and mapping to prevent losses from IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and hopefully track down particularly annoying Talibanis. If only DoD had access to an Afghani Marauder’s Map…

The VADER system is a response to the difficulty of efficiently detecting IEDs. Apparently DoD has used everything to no avail: “radio frequency jammers to hulking trucks to blimps to lightning guns.” Lightning guns can’t get these things?! Obviously these devices are an extreme obstacle to obtaining an acceptable level of security in Afghanistan. Moreover, an April estimate attributed 75% of coalition deaths to IEDs. Something must be done to detect and deter use of these explosives if any sort of progress is to be had in Afghanistan.

VADER is also specifically designed with the Afghani populous in mind; according to Lt. General Thomas Metz, “Ground movement indicators were very valuable in Iraq … But the enemy kind of rode to work in Iraq. The enemy walks to work in Afghanistan. So we are developing a sensor that can see dismounts – and therefore can cue other sensors to those dismounts.” This observation signals that DoD is getting smarter about weaponry and technology use in Afghanistan: cultural traits and memes matter. The first test flight of a drone equipped with a VADER system was completed this week by Northrop Grumman. Hopefully these systems will be out in the field soon.

Mischief managed!

As Pakistan targets militants, militants respond with terror tactics

With our recent class discussion on terrorism and the Fall Conference’s lumping together of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a virtually unified concern, it’s coincidental that there has been a lot of terrorist activity in Pakistan lately. The recent surge in violence in Pakistan mirrors what is occurring and has occurred across its border in Afghanistan. Ever since Pakistan has begun actively targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters in South Waziristan, terrorist attacks have been conducted against Pakistani military and civilian targets in urban and rural areas. The Pakistani people are worrying that the relative inattention the militants had shown them has ended, that “the Pakistani state is under siege.”

It seems Islamist militants are utilizing new tactics, or have been engaged in new types of targets as of late. In Islamabad on Thursday October 22nd, two assailants on a motorbike fired automatic weapons at a military jeep, killing a brigadier and his driver. On Friday October 23rd, Taliban rockets and suicide bombs targeted a strategic airbase, a restaurant, and a civilian bus carrying wedding guests, killing at least 27 and wounding many others. In the last three weeks, more than 200 people have been killed in response to the Army’s assault against the Taliban in South Waziristan. Other targets include markets, universities, and UN offices. Could this “new strategy of varied and unpredictable attacks” ultimately lead to a U.S. foray into this favored country of terror organizations?

Of course, entry into Pakistan would be challenging for several reasons and is unlikely to occur. Pakistan is a nuclear power with greater size and government strength than Afghanistan and could not be so easily told that they will accept an American military presence within its borders. Additionally, the U.S. under the Obama Administration seems hesitant to send anything but the consensus bare minimum troops to an international conflict. As Obama has yet to decide his position on Afghanistan, he certainly won't be making any critical decisions regarding Pakistan any time soon.

Despite the volume of recent attacks, this certainly is not the extent of Pakistan’s problems with terror organizations. Militant Taliban groups in the west have formed alliances with militant Punjabi groups fighting for Kashmir in the east, and Pakistan has known of this for some time. It seems to be a classic case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, as terror groups coalesce against governments set on bringing down their organizations. But eastern provinces have been reluctant to admit a jihadi presence in Punjabi areas for fear of greater Pakistani
or even U.S. military involvement in the region.. However, according to the recently passed Kerry-Lugar bill in which the U.S. provides Pakistan with $7.5 billion in civilian aid over the next 5 years, Pakistan is required to make progress in battling Punjab-based terror organizations. Accepting this aid may include the implicit understanding the U.S. reserves the right to intervene as it sees fit.

If more frequent and damaging attacks occur and militant alliances continue to be formed, it doesn’t seem out of the realm of possibility that the Pakistani military could ask for U.S. and international assistance, if they were provided assurances that our entry would be for this limited purpose. Because the old principle applies again: from Pakistan’s view, the enemy (the U.S.) of its enemy (new extremists) would be its friend.

Tentative Agreement with Iran

The multilateral talks with Iran may have yielded some fruit. Tehran has tentatively agreed to transfer approximately 75% of its known enriched uranium stock to Russia where it will be enriched to 20% purity. From there, it will be transferred to France for further processing and then shipped back to Tehran for use in its medical research reactor. This deal would leave Tehran with about 300 kilograms of low enriched uranium in its own stockpile. Tehran has the option of further enriching this material itself, but it will yield only about 6 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which is only a fifth of what is needed to make a bomb. So in effect, Tehran has agreed to postpone its bomb-making threshold for about a year (danger room has estimated an even shorter timeline of about three to four months) in return for international participation (and therefore inspection) of its nuclear processes and international recognition of its right to refine uranium.

Israel, of course, is quite concerned about all this. Israel’s Minister of Defense Ehud Barak has expressed his disapproval of the draft agreement and the concomitant legitimization of an Iranian civilian nuclear program. He claims that Iran’s real motive is the production of nuclear weapons and this deal will only give Iran a veneer of compliance while Tehran secretly perfects its bomb-making capabilities. Some elements in Tehran are also upset with the agreement, claiming that it violates Iran’s sovereignty. The deputy speaker of Iran’s parliament has publicly criticized the agreement; however, Iran’s representative to the IAEA has stated that this plan was an Iranian proposal. The United States is hoping that this deal will buy some time to work out a more comprehensive deal that will permanently address Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Russia is just happy that they don’t have to sanction anyone.

Is this a policy victory for the US? Probably not. At best, this deal is just a way of postponing the really difficult decisions. It does, however, prove that Iran and the United States are capable of talking to each other. These are the highest level talks that have occurred between the two countries in three decades. Considering this and the fact that the deal was reached after only three days of negotiations, it seems quite possible that there is a good chance for further negotiations on other issues. Functionalists rejoice!

Karzai Agrees to a Runoff

On August 20, 2009, Afghans went to the polls for their country's second election since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Soon after the election was held, accusations of fraud emerged which contested the validity of the election's results which had shown commanding lead for incumbent President Hamid Karzai. Forms of fraud included illegitimate voter cards, bribes, armed coercion, and the closure of many polling stations due to violence threats. One UN official declared that as many as one in five votes for Karzai may have been illegal. In addition, fear held many voters away from the polls as only an estimated 30% per cent of the public participated in the elections.

These figures prompted Abdullah Abdullah to challenge the election results. Since that time the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission has investigated the claims of fraud and miscalculation. The investigation led to the belief that support for Karzai had fallen below 50%, a mark which if not met requires a run-off election. After relentless pressure from Western politicians to accept the ECC's findings, Karzai has agreed to a run-off election set to take place on November 7, 2009.

Karzai has said before that this Western pressure actually has negative effects for his country. As early as September 7, Karzai argued in a French magazine, Le Figaro, that the US was attacking him to make him more tractable. He followed by saying, "It is in no one's interest to have an Afghan president who has become an American puppet."

Despite the possibility of giving the appearance of Karzai as a Western puppet, the US has continued to apply pressure to Karzai to agree to a run-off election. The reason US officials continued to pressure Karzai to accept a run-off is because they need his government to be perceived as legitimate and accepted by the Afghan people. If it is not perceived as legitimate, the US fears that there will not be public support for the government. Our efforts to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda rely on public support for our troops. The Afghan people and its government must be united, otherwise, the US will end up fighting for a government that it not wanted by its people, and the people may end up resisting the government and US troops.

Therefore, Karzai's acceptance for a run-off election is a major step in the right direction for the US war efforts in Afghanistan. On November 7th, the world will witness the emergence of a legitimate leader of Afghanistan. Let's hope that the run-off elections will have a less controversial outcome.

Ocean's Fourteen: A New Role for the New Iraqi Army

The New Iraqi Army, created in 2003 (and has since undergone many alterations, disbandings, reforms, etc), is charged with the mission of protecting Iraq from internal and external threats. However, the New Army is taking on another role, perhaps better suited to the chaps at Interpol: reclaiming stolen art and artifacts. According to Major General Abdul al-Zaidi, "the duty of Iraqi army is not only to chase the terrorists but also to protect state treasures." After the 2003 invasion, the National Museum of Baghdad was completely looted. The museum held thousands of valuable artifacts dating back to the Mesopotamian era (roughly 7 millennia ago). For any art and archaeology buff, this event was an absolute tragedy, though it was far down on the list of concerns of the Iraqi people.

This attitude has now turned. The Iraqi Army is on a hunt for these lost and stolen antiquities and those who seek to sell them on the black market. Antiquities dealing is a lucrative business since these artifacts are worth billions. Such pursuits may be on the decline, however, with the Army's apprehension of 3 men attempting to sell Sumerian antiquities to an undercover intelligence officer.

Perhaps this new role for the Iraqi Army is a good stepping stone, providing experience in intelligence and operations which could help them in future pursuits against terrorists. Art and antiquities dealers operate in a highly clandestine manner, much like terrorists; an acumen in seeking out off-the-radar operations may prove a vital skill in the future. Though amateur peddlers of ancient artifacts are usually less armed than terrorists or insurgents, you have to start somewhere.

Russia May be Playing Hard Ball

I may have spoke too soon yesterday about Russian co-operation. Here's an article from Danger Room. Apparently the secretary of the Kremlin's security council is proposing a doctrine that advocates the use of nuclear weapons in preventative strikes against opponents (even opponents that are conventionally armed).

Detente Part Two

Kommersant has reported that Washington will drop its public criticism of Russian human rights problems. According to the article, the United States would only discuss human rights with Russia in intergovernmental forums. This revelation, of course, comes as talks with Iran are underway and after Washington agreed to scrap its missile defense programs in Poland and the Czech Republic. Secretary of State Clinton is in Moscow today and spoke about an agreement between Russia and the United States to co-operate on a range of issues including Afghanistan, Iran and arms reduction. She is also expected to announce a joint missile defense program between the US and Russia.

The Obama administration is backing up its rhetoric and actually engaging Russia on some of its own terms. Russia, for its part, has agreed to work with the United States on confronting Iran, but has remained skeptical of sanctions.

Co-operation between the United States and Russia is still in its infancy. The only real political exchange between Washington and Moscow was the trading of a non-existing missile defense program for non-existing sanctions. Regardless of the triviality of this agreement, it is still indicative of a much better relationship between the US and Russia than during the Bush years when relations steadily deteriorated.

Most importantly, the events of the past few weeks indicate that the Obama administration is willing to give Russia something that it has been seeking since the collapse of the Soviet Union: respect. By negotiating with Russia and yielding to a few of their requests, the US is telling the Kremlin that it is a significant geopolitical power. Secretary of State Clinton even said that the ties between Washington and Moscow were now based on "mutual respect".

The Obama administration is following through with its rhetoric on engaging the rest of the world and using diplomacy as a means of affecting its foreign policy objectives. Unfortunately, this may happen at the expense of Russia’s human rights record. Hopefully the Kremlin will warm up enough to the White House for some significant foreign policy actions to take place and make this trade worthwhile.

The Forgotten Continent?

I get it. President Obama has more than a full plate of foreign affairs that he is dealing with and trying to manage. From Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Copenhagen, missile defense systems in Europe and working with Russia, and now a trip to Oslo, our President's attention is in high demand. So maybe it makes sense that South America isn't at the forefront of concerns as far as foreign policy goes.

BUT.....

there are legitimate concerns and issues that should be addressed and not overlooked.

While the US has is focusing on pressuring Russia to pressure Iran, Venezuela's president is strategically making moves and alliances with those two countries. Chavez is focusing on making arms deals with Russia to acquire guns, jets, tanks, and helicopters while at the same time making friends with almost anyone who America doesn't like or vice versa. Such a move got little notice in the news except for Secretary of State Clinton stating the obvious that it is a "seriously challenge to stability" (The Economist, "Venezuela's Foreign Policy", September 17, 2009). Of course, I realize that Venezuela isn't as worrisome as a nuclear Iran and that it makes sense to be focusing on the more pressing issues. But simply for energy security regions, perhaps its not in America's interest for Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and other oil producing nations to be closely tied while America ignores it.

Furthermore, the coup in Honduras was a 'serious challenge to democracy' and, I believe, should have received more attention and criticism from the United States. Also, I think that most of Latin America finds it insulting that the only interest we have in Cuba is torturing terrorists there. Despite President's Obama to shut down Guantanamo within a year of taking office, no serous efforts have been made.

It's a precarious time in the world and a lot of serious demands on foreign policy. However, the US would do well to take a more vested interest in it's neighbors political environments rather than strictly focusing on the Middle East and Europe.

At least, South America can hope for the US's attention in 2016.

Sovereignty & the Nuclear Threat

“Iran might be creating nuclear weapons; what are we going to do about it?” If this question has been debated once in the past month it’s been done thousands of times. In a venture into the hypothetical that most readers will find frivolous and some will find irrelevant, it remains important to discuss and keep in focus why this is a question at all. It has become clear that the goal of current global leadership is to halt or undermine any attempt by the Iranian government to use nuclear power to create weapons, and with good reason. Ahmadinejad’s administration has proved oppressive domestically and reckless abroad. What is viewed as Western meddling in the affairs of her neighbors has made Iran wary of allowing the domineering, overreaching powers to have a hand in any of its affairs. Acts such as the September 27 missile launch are likely designed to act as proof that, if you’ll excuse the expression, Iran’s colors don’t run; she won’t be dissuaded by harsh words from Uncle Sam. It follows then, that such demonstrations of Irani determination will likely continue if the West doesn’t back off (which we all know is not going to happen any time soon).

At this point, I think it’s important to play a little devil’s advocate and look at the situation with stark objectivity. What most policy makers, journalists, and observers have chosen to overlook is the issue of Iran’s national sovereignty. To many, such a concept seems archaic; the notion that a state can be openly hostile to most of the rest of the planet but remain untouched by other players because of its sovereignty seems like an argument from two centuries past. It is relevant today, however, because that sovereignty is exactly what Iran is struggling to maintain in a world of states with their noses in everybody else’s business. Iran has watched outside powers come into her neighborhood, do all kinds of damage, and radically alter the status quo. Realizing that those same powers are now increasingly wary of her own potential threat, Iran’s leaders are desperate to prove that they will not lay down and accept the same treatment that has been allowed to occur in the past.

Thus, we arrive at the discussion of Irani nuclear weaponry. At present, the United States and friends are devising the best way to “deal” with the Irani threat; in essence, how can they force Ahmadinejad to stop creating nuclear weapons (assuming he is) and prevent him from doing it in the future? This premise, however, ignores Iran’s basic necessity for sovereignty. According to the accepted notion of what constitutes a state and her areas of sovereignty, Iran’s government should have the freedom to use their nuclear capabilities in any way they see fit to benefit the nation. In such a case, what right do other states have to prevent her from defending her borders and her people? No nation desires to be bullied, and certainly not one like Iran with such a strong sense of historical pride.

In short, while the rest of the world certainly has justified cause for concern regarding a nuclear Iran, when dealing with her, leaders must be cautious. Treating Iran like a deeply mischievous child and slapping punishments on with barely concealed contempt and condescension will hardly solve the problem; in fact, it is more likely to make the situation worse. Iran must be treated like the sovereign nation she is, and discussions must appear to be balanced if progress is to be made. Only when she receives respect will she respect in return and be more likely to openly discuss efforts put forth by international parties.

Sending Messages

Last week’s class emphasized the idea that sending messages and understanding an adversary's "language" is essential for national security strategies. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad certainly doesn't need a lesson in sending messages, but perhaps an approach for the Obama administration (and no less, policymakers in Israel) is to ensure itself that it understands Ahmadinejad's messages to the extent that it won't err in any reply. Namely, can we view the Iranian regime as a rational actor - in which case Drezner optimistically summarizes the first round of P5 + 1 negotiations under the realism view - perhaps with a grand strategy that exploits previous American mistakes, or do Ahmadinejad and friends exemplify crazy behavior (as user 0--0 implied in commenting to the previous post)? I would argue that whether or not Iran is rational is certainly not the only factor in determining the West's approach toward and forthcoming relationships with Iran, but it is nevertheless significant, especially as messages emanating from Tehran are often complex and conflicting.

The question posed is one that perhaps Mr. Ahmadinejad himself is unable to answer; in a recent interview with Newsweek, he asked many more questions than did the interviewer (when the interviewer posits that Stalin's crimes were equally atrocious as the Holocaust in order to elicit a response, Ahmadinejad replies with 10 consecutive questions and finally a statement about embargoes in Gaza). However, if Iran is indeed a rational actor, it may have incentives to hide or misrepresent its capabilities in the name of deterrence and to send certain mixed messages. For instance, does the highly-publicized enrichment facility in Qom further Iran's scientific goals in medicine, as its leader and equally ambiguously-spoken former Iranian IAEA representative proclaim, or is it and many other clandestine facilities part of a nuclear weapon-making scheme of which at least one report claims Iran is capable? And do Ahmadinejad's vitriolic statements against Jews represent a true hatred, or is this behavior meant to distance himself from his ostensibly Jewish past in an Islamic state? I'm not convinced that Ahmadinejad reads more American press than Iranian press, which he claims: "I don't read the [Iranian] press, so I would not know," among many other there's-no-way-that's-true statements.

These unanswerable questions, alongside many others analyzed by leaders in the West won't help to understand Ahmadinejad's true motives or rationality as an actor on the international stage. Instead, by considering the mixed messages and their implications of a rational or irrational Iran, the West (and particularly P5 +1 + Israel) can more carefully approach the negotiations table and the nuclear issue. While the U.S. may not bring much credibility in the eyes of Iran as a result of certain unsuccessful campaigns in the middle east, it is certainly obvious to the West how much Iran values its nuclear-related facilities. As Iran continually demonstrates its missile and nuclear capabilities, the West and its allies have to focus on what these messages (and the unsent ones) mean for diplomacy and security interests in the region.

Iran Tests Missiles

On Sunday, Iran's Revolutionary Guard tested three short-range missiles, with a range of 90-120 miles. Today, Iran tested its Shahab-3 and Sajjil rockets, which have a range of up to 1,240 miles. Analysts claim that these latest missiles could threaten both Israel and US forces in the Gulf. In fact, a Revolutionary Guard official has stated, “Iranian missiles are able to target any place that threatens Iran."

As we discussed in class, one of the reasons that negotiated settlements aren't available between rational actors is because countries often misrepresent their capabilities. With the first direct talks between the U.S. and Iran set for Thursday in Geneva, it could very well be that Iran is trying to appear more capable than it really is. However, last week we were given an example of how Iran also conceals its capabilities when Iran revealed to the world that it had a second plant for uranimum enrichment. Accurate intelligence on the true capabilities of Iran would provide greater insight into Iran's intentions and is necessary for the proper development of a US security strategy against Iran.

The Turning Point in Afghanistan?

There is presently a total lack of policy direction in Afghanistan. Congress is focused almost entirely on healthcare and President Obama has so much on his plate right now that he seems to be sidetracked when it comes to putting together the administration’s policy for Afghanistan. We are at a critical point in the War in Afghanistan and no one seems to know what the official policy is. On the one had General McChrystal has called for more troops in order to run a counterinsurgency campaign that would better secure the population. This is a strategy advocated in “The Accidental Guerrilla” by David Kilcullen and other counterinsurgency experts. The Karzai government has also made the case for additional troops. On the other hand Vice President Biden has been vocally opposed to a troop increase, even calling for troop reductions. He wants to focus on small Special Forces and aerial attacks in order to kill the bad guys. For many, this seems to be an easier alternative to troop increases- but it would not be effective. The ongoing drone attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan have surely killed terrorists; however, they create a lot more collateral damage than soldiers on the ground. This raiding mentality contributes to the accidental guerrilla problem that Kilcullen writes about. The only way to really win in Afghanistan is by securing the population from the Taliban and Al Qaeda by having troops on the ground in the local communities.

The U.S. has had eight years to figure out the best counterinsurgency strategy, but it could be too late to implement it. Troop levels were kept low in order to wage war in Iraq and now that additional troops are needed for a surge in Afghanistan it is questionable whether that will happen. According to an article in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, our NATO allies have much lower public opinion for troop increases than the U.S. does. Only a third of Americans want to reduce or withdraw troops; that number is over fifty percent in the other major NATO countries. Our NATO allies are in a holding pattern waiting for a coherent U.S. policy on Afghanistan. They would jump at the chance to reduce their presence in Afghanistan if the U.S. did so as well. If a troop increase is going to happen, it needs to happen now under U.S. leadership. If we do not give McChrystal what he needs then we are risking leaving Afghanistan even worse than we found it.

Iran Admits to Having a Secret, Underground Nuclear Facility

So let’s talk about Iran. On Monday Iran admitted that it has a secret, underground uranium enrichment facility at Natanz (pretty cool, right?). The timeline for events in the past week seems to be:

(1) Iran admitting to the IAEA that it has been building an enrichment facility for several years (though it isn’t clear if all of the equipment is installed or if the plant has actually been “turned on”),

(2) Shock and outrage in the international community that Iran would do such a thing,

(3) President Obama and other leaders of the G-20 (which is meeting today) condemned Iran for their illegal facility and demanding that international inspectors be allowed access. Nicolas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown both echoed Obama’s statements and even Dmitri Medvedev made some noises to that affect (though Medvedev’s tone was a quite a bit more conciliatory).

What’s interesting about all this is not the fact the United States has known about the facility for years (the internet is abuzz with such chatter and debates about who knew what and when), but that the United States is not saying that Iran has to be a nuclear free country. President Obama has even said that Iran has the right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The peaceful use of nuclear energy has been in the US’s rhetoric for a long time, but the fact that the President is using this language right now, right after Iran admitted to having the facility and right before dialogue on the subject begins next week, makes it sound like the US is warming up a little bit to the notion of an Iranian nuclear program. Granted, the US still wants lots of multinational inspectors and restrictions so that the facility can only refine uranium up to 5% (weapons grade nuclear programs require 90%), but still the US is inching closer to conciliation.

The time is ripe for some diplomacy: the missile programs in Eastern Europe have been scrapped so Russia might actually help this time, and the US refrained from excessively harsh rhetoric during the Iranian election scandal so Ahmadinejad and his government are still willing to come to the table. The US has made quite a few sacrifices for these talks, lets hope they go somewhere.

Are we there yet?

With the release of General McChrystal’s report, asking for 50,000 more pairs of boots in Afghanistan, the somewhat forgotten, back-burnered war has come back to the front pages. However, it seems that the American people disagree with McChrystal: a recent USA Today/Gallup poll reported that about half of Americans (give or take 4%) oppose a troop surge in Afghanistan. This comes as a dramatic shift in opinion, as almost 65% of Americans supported upping our numbers in the country earlier this year. As a campaign promise made by both Senator McCain and President Obama in the 2008 election, I absolutely expected a rise in troops and support of such a move. Although I’m certain every American would be positively ecstatic to wash his or her hands of continued conflict in the Middle East (are we there yet?)something has to be done to “fix” the Afghan problem, at least for now. Unfortunately, the long-awaited elections did not go as smoothly as planned (or hoped), leaving increased stability and an independently functioning democracy in the dust for the time being.


It seems the best option, and what is proposed in amalgam by Republicans and Democrats alike, is a surge en masse: troops, aid, you name it. If it is well planned (the eternal problem) with a concrete vision (another obvious barrier to success in any operation and one emphasized by Senator John Kerry – something I actually agree with the man on), such an all-encompassing surge could work (and should work). If all components of the surge are sent in and a concrete expectation and plan are set, significant change will hopefully be in sight.

To Nuke or Not to Nuke…

To continue class discussion a bit, I wanted to advocate an idea that was introduced in the scenario of China bombing Sydney. The idea was brought up that the U.S. should carry out a nuclear strike on a comparable city (or cities) in China. I did not introduce the idea, but I think that this would be the way to go.

The first and probably the most obvious reason being that there should be some sort of punitive response on behalf of Sydney. After all, they did just lose over 4 million people. I don’t see much difference regarding where the bomb comes from (U.S., Japan or Australia) since the U.S. would be the source of it anyway, and the Chinese would recognize us as the culprits regardless.

The second reason to bomb a city rather than a strictly military facility is that it would make the Chinese government much more accountable to its people. I realize that this sounds callus, but I believe that the Chinese government would be more reluctant to continue the game of retaliation if it lost citizens (and would continue to do so) and not just military personnel. I also realize that this would be a HUGE gamble, since it could quite possibly lead to a nuclear holocaust, but I believe that if the U.S. demonstrated that it was willing to retaliate in this manor, that it would be a sufficient deterrent.

The third reason to intervene on the behalf of Australia (and Taiwan as well) is that if we decided not to do anything, then the idea of allies becomes nullified. The U.S. would become a global pariah. Militaristically, we would only be able to act unilaterally because we would not be able to count on the loyalty of our allies, and understandably so.

This strategy would allow the U.S. to honor its responsibilities, punish China for its actions, and hopefully prevent further nuclear strikes on U.S. allies. Ideally, Taiwan could then go about its day and become independent. But this is 2012 we’re talking about here, so maybe we’re all doomed anyway…